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THE BURDENS OF THE EXCESSIVE FINES CLAUSE

BETH A. COLGAN*
ABSTRACT
A key component is missing from the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause doctrine: Who has the burden of proof? This
question—which has been essentially ignored by both federal and
state courts—is not just a second-order problem. Rather, the
assignment of burdens of proof is essential to the Clause’s enforcement, making it harder—or easier—for the government to abuse the
revenue-generating capacity of economic sanctions in ways that can
entrench poverty, particularly in heavily policed communities of
color.
This Article takes on this question by first sorting through a
morass within the U.S. Supreme Court’s due process doctrine as it
relates to assessing the fundamental fairness of procedural practices,
including the assignment of burdens of proof. After offering a
framework that reconciles the doctrine, it applies that framework to
the excessive fines context by breaking the “burden of proof” into four
component parts: (1) the burden to raise the excessive fines claim, (2)
the burden of producing evidence relevant to that claim, (3) the
burden of persuading the decision maker as to the result, and (4) the
standard of proof to be employed in that determination. While the
government and private interests at stake remain constant across
these various burdens, disentangling them allows a more exacting
inquiry. In particular, it allows for an examination of how lawmakers have crafted related processes and structures—such as the refusal
* Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law. I wish to thank Albertina Antognini, Kevin
Arlyck, Kellen Funk, Thea Johnson, Kaiponanea Matsumura, Richard Re, Joanna Schwartz,
and Jordan Blair Woods. This Article benefitted from exceptional research support by UCLA
Law Librarian Shangching Huitzacua, as well as Megan Kelly, Thomas Rueter, and the
editorial staff of the William & Mary Law Review.
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to provide counsel or the vast array of direct and collateral consequences attached to both non-payment and conviction—that make it
more likely that abuses of power will occur absent the check on
authority that burdens of proof can help provide.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2019, the California Supreme Court took a rare step in the
development of the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause
jurisprudence, directing the parties in a pending case to answer a
question that is straightforward only on its surface: Who carries the
burden of proof in establishing the financial effect of a fine for
purposes of the excessiveness inquiry—the person fined or the
government?1 This question is noteworthy not only because it had
not been a central issue as a series of related cases wound their way
through California’s intermediate appellate courts,2 but also because
the assignment of burdens of proof in the excessive fines setting has
effectively been taken for granted.3 In the few cases that reference
burdens of proof, the lower courts presume the burden is on the
defendant either without meaningful analysis or citation to
authority,4 or by reference to the placement of burdens on the
1. See People v. Kopp, 451 P.3d 776, 776 (Cal. 2019). This case remained pending at the
time of publication. The California Supreme Court previously held that financial effect is
relevant to the excessiveness inquiry. See People ex rel. Lockyer v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,
124 P.3d 408, 421 (Cal. 2005). The United States Supreme Court has yet to address that issue.
See infra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
2. See, e.g., People v. Kopp, 250 Cal. Rptr. 3d 852, 893-94 (Ct. App. 2019) (stating that
it is the individual’s burden to prove financial effect, without conducting a constitutional
inquiry); see also People v. McMahan, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 708, 713 (Ct. App. 1992) (involving only
statutory interpretation).
3. This Article focuses on open questions regarding the assignment of burdens of proof
at sentencing; the U.S. Supreme Court has determined that on appeal, the factual findings
of the trial court are subject to a clearly erroneous standard and that the ultimate question
of excessiveness should be reviewed de novo. United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 336
n.10 (1998) (citing Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574-75 (1985); Ornelas v. United
States, 517 U.S. 690, 697 (1996)).
4. For example, the First Circuit has stated: “It is the defendant’s burden to show unconstitutionality.” United States v. Fogg, 666 F.3d 13, 19 (1st Cir. 2011). To support that
contention, the court cited United States v. Jose, 499 F.3d 105, 108 (1st Cir. 2007), which in
turn cited United States v. Ortiz-Cintron, 461 F.3d 78, 81-82 (1st Cir. 2006) and United States
v. Heldeman, 402 F.3d 220, 223 (1st Cir. 2005), both of which speak only about deference to
district court factual findings during de novo review. This mismatch has metastasized across
jurisdictions. See, e.g., United States v. Castello, 611 F.3d 116, 120 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing Jose,
449 F.3d at 108) (supporting the contention that the defendant has a burden to show unconstitutionality of a forfeiture); United States v. Cheeseman, 600 F.3d 270, 283 (3d Cir. 2010)
(same); United States v. King, 231 F. Supp. 3d 872, 907-08 (W.D. Okla. 2017) (citing Fogg, 666
F.3d at 18-19) (stating the burden on both financial effect and the ultimate question of excessiveness rests with the defendant). In other cases, there is no attempt to cite to authority.
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person challenging a non-financial punishment as cruel and unusual without consideration of any potentially relevant distinctions
between the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines and Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clauses.5
The question the California Supreme Court posed is of no small
matter. While the United States Supreme Court has interpreted the
Excessive Fines Clause to outlaw economic sanctions when their
severity is grossly disproportionate to the seriousness of the
offense,6 it has not addressed who must prove the case and by how
much.7 Yet, the assignment of burdens of proof is not just a secondorder problem to the question of the scope of the Clause’s protections; rather, that assignment is essential to its enforcement.8
Burdens of proof may make it harder—or easier—for the government to abuse the revenue-generating capacity of economic
sanctions by imposing punishments out of proportion with its
legitimate penal aims, including sanctions which may create or
entrench poverty for people and their families, particularly in
heavily policed communities of color.
To answer this question, this Article begins by offering a framework that reconciles incoherence within the U.S. Supreme Court’s
due process doctrine, the situs of the Court’s jurisprudence on the
See, e.g., United States v. 829 Calle de Madero, 100 F.3d 734, 738 (10th Cir. 1996) (“The
burden of showing excessiveness is on the claimant.”).
5. See, e.g., United States v. Vriner, 921 F.2d 710, 712-13 (7th Cir. 1991) (citing Solem
v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 288 (1983)). Again, this myopic approach has spread from court to
court. For example, United States v. Alexander, 32 F.3d 1231, 1235 (8th Cir. 1994) relied on
United States v. Bucuvalas, 970 F.2d 937, 946 (1st Cir. 1992), which in turn relied on Tart v.
Massachusetts, 949 F.2d 490, 503 n.16 (1st Cir. 1991), which based its conclusion that the
defendant carried the burden of proving excessiveness on cruel and unusual punishments
cases.
6. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 334.
7. The extent of the Court’s intervention on this point is found in a dissenting opinion
in which Justice Kennedy stated without analysis that “[a] defendant must prove a gross
disproportion.” Id. at 348 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also United States v. Ahmad, 213 F.3d
805, 816 (4th Cir. 2000) (placing the burden on the person claiming excessiveness and citing
to the Bajakajian dissent); United States v. DeGregory, 480 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1304 (S.D. Fla.
2006) (same); In re Prop. of Flores, 711 N.W.2d 733 (Iowa Ct. App. 2006) (unpublished table
decision) (same).
8. See Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 9 (2004)
(distinguishing “judicial determinations of what the Constitution means” from “distinct doctrinal rules that direct how courts—faced, as they inevitably are, with epistemic uncertainty—are to determine whether the constitutional meaning has been complied with”).
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assignment of burdens of proof. In Mathews v. Eldridge, the Court
announced a three-part test for assessing procedural rules in which
consideration is given to governmental interests, private interests,
and the risk that the rule—in this case, the burden—will exacerbate
the likelihood of an erroneous decision.9 In subsequent years, the
Court relied on that test for assessing the fundamental fairness of
both criminal and civil procedural rules.10 But after sixteen years of
employing the Mathews test, the Court muddied the waters in Medina v. California.11 Acting out of deference to state lawmakers in
establishing penal laws, the Medina Court stated it was rejecting
the application of Mathews in the criminal sphere, replacing it with
a test that required an examination of whether the assignment of a
burden “offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions
and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.”12 But
Medina and its progeny have left unclear the role history is to play:
Is it a gatekeeper or merely probative evidence?
If the current doctrine is interpreted so that the historical record
serves as a gatekeeper, lawmakers could entrench their ability to
abuse the prosecutorial power and thereby extract revenues through
economic sanctions—the exact thing the Clause is designed to prevent. They could do so by placing onerous burdens on a person
raising a challenge simply because the available historical record
cannot be used to establish a long-standing practice as to the
assignment of burdens. The historical record related to the Excessive Fines Clause reveals why that approach is nonsensical. The
record exposes a long history of abuse, dating back at least to Magna Carta, whereby governments have repeatedly exploited the
prosecutorial power, using economic sanctions to generate revenue
as a tax-avoidance mechanism by imposing exorbitant fines on
people who were politically vulnerable.13 Even if procedural rules
had been established in those periods, they would be tainted by
those abuses, the antithesis of fundamental fairness. The historical
record on procedures related to the excessiveness of economic
9. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263-71 (1970)).
10. See, e.g., Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77-84 (1984) (criminal procedural rules);
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979) (civil procedural rules).
11. 505 U.S. 437, 445-46 (1992).
12. Id. at 445 (quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201-02 (1977)).
13. See infra notes 67-87 and accompanying text.
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sanctions is also limited by a variety of other factors, including a
lack of attention to economic sanctions by commentators, changes
in litigation methods, and conflicting historical practices.14
There is, however, a way to reconcile the doctrine. Mathews allows us to focus on modern conceptions of risk: Will the assignment
of burdens significantly interfere with an important government
function, what risks does a person face if the determination is
wrong, and how within the particular inquiry would the burden
affect the decision maker’s ability to reach a proper conclusion?
History can aid in thinking through those questions. The longstanding history of abuse, for example, helps make plain that otherwise
well-recognized government interests, such as the interest in imposing punishment for wrongdoing, must be taken with greater
caution.15 But for the record to be used appropriately, we must be
honest about its limitations, taking into account those abuses, refusing to fill in the blanks where the record is incomplete, and
recognizing and respecting anachronisms. In other words, under
this approach history can serve as a partner with, rather than a
gatekeeper to, modern understandings of fundamental fairness.
With that framework for assessing fundamental fairness in mind,
this Article turns to the assignment of burdens of proof for excessive
fines claims. It does so by breaking the “burden of proof” into its
component parts: the burden to raise an excessive fines claim, the
burden of producing evidence related to the claim, the burden of
persuading the decision maker as to the result, and the standard of
proof to be employed in making that determination. For all of the
burdens, the governmental interests remain the same: the interest
in responding to violations of the law; in removing the means of
committing crimes and the proceeds generated by them from the
hands of those who offend; in restoring victims of crime through
financial support; in avoiding unnecessary administrative and
economic costs; in ensuring that the operation of legal systems
comports with the Constitution; and in protecting its own legitimacy.16 So, too, the private interests at stake: no matter the burden,
people upon whom excessive fines are imposed face the risk of
14. See infra notes 89-103 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 112-30 and accompanying text.
16. See infra Part II.A.1.
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financial precarity that prevents them and their families from
meeting basic human needs, subjects them to highly punitive and
stigmatizing responses to nonpayment and further punishment, and
strips their communities of access to the resources that may
otherwise allow them better opportunities to thrive and engage in
full civic participation.17
Disentangling the various aspects of the burdens of proof allows
a more exacting focus of the third Mathews consideration: the way
in which an assignment of each particular burden may exacerbate
the risk that an erroneous determination—or even no determination
at all—will be reached as to the excessiveness of fines. Attending to
the burden of raising an excessive fines claim prompts an inquiry
into what structures lawmakers have created that would prevent
such claims from being raised, such as a denial of counsel or other
system designs that render challenges unlikely.18 Distinguishing the
burden of production allows us to move beyond assumptions about
the challenger having access to all information regarding their
ability to pay or absorb economic sanctions and to recognize that the
government has unique access to information about the vast
apparatus it has created—including its collections mechanisms,
penalties for nonpayment, and collateral consequences of conviction—that directly relate to the severity of the punishment.19
Focusing precisely on the burdens and standards of persuasion
better attends to the risks created by the inherently imprecise
nature of assessing overall excessiveness and financial effect, the
racial and cultural biases that may infect those determinations, and
the lack of opportunities for reversing the improper imposition of
excessive sanctions.20
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I begins by identifying
the two places within the excessive fines inquiry for which burdens
of proof remain unassigned: the determination of financial effect of
the economic sanction for the purpose of establishing punishment
severity, and the ultimate determination that sanctions are
constitutionally excessive. It then sets out and proposes a way of
17.
18.
19.
20.

See infra Part II.A.2.
See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part II.C.
See infra Part II.D.
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reconciling the Mathews-Medina conundrum that allows history to
play a role without unduly predominating the due process inquiry.
Part II then applies that framework in the excessive fines context,21
detailing contemporary concerns and risks while plumbing the
historical record for what it has to offer. It concludes each assessment of the four burdens with a proposal for their assignment. The
proposed burdens and standards of proof vary depending on how
lawmakers have devised related procedures and structures that
make abuse more likely and exacerbate the risk of private harm,
and by the type of economic sanction at issue. Finally, Part III
addresses how courts could make those competing burdens and
standards of persuasion between economic sanction types (for
example, fines and restitution), or punishment types (economic or
carceral) administrable, and perhaps even promote a more thoughtful examination of disproportionality by sentencing judges than
currently occurs.
I. SETTING THE SCOPE OF THE INQUIRY
Before undertaking an assignment of the burdens of proof in the
excessive fines setting, it is necessary to address two issues in order
to set the scope of the inquiry. First are the Eighth Amendment
parameters for assessing excessiveness itself. Section A sets out the
mechanism for that assessment—which turns on a finding of gross
disproportionality—and in particular what aspects of the test require an assignment of burdens. The second issue is the question of
what factors are relevant to that assignment. Section B discusses
how the Court has approached this question through the Due
Process Clause’s requirement of fundamental fairness, though the
messiness of that doctrine leaves open questions about the role of
historical practices in making that assessment. A framework for
resolving the doctrinal disorder follows.
21. The Court has treated juveniles as having enhanced rights within the cruel and unusual punishments context. See, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 74 (2010). This suggests
that the Court may take a more protective approach to juveniles in the excessive fines context
as well, but that analysis—as well as considerations of fundamental fairness in juvenile court
proceedings in which parents or guardians may be held jointly or severally liable for economic
sanctions imposed on juveniles adjudicated delinquent—are beyond the scope of this Article.
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 985.437(2)-(3).
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A. The Excessiveness Inquiry
The assignment of burdens is absent from the doctrine as to two
issues of contestation within the excessiveness inquiry: the determination of the financial effect of an economic sanction on a person
and his or her family, and the ultimate determination of whether
the sanctions to be imposed are grossly disproportionate to the
underlying offense.
In United States v. Bajakajian, the Court adopted the gross
disproportionality test for measuring whether economic sanctions
are excessive, which requires weighing offense seriousness and punishment severity.22 On the offense-seriousness side of the scale are
crime and culpability facts.23 The crime facts—facts about the nature of the offense and the person’s culpability for it—must be
established at trial beyond a reasonable doubt or via guilty plea in
criminal matters,24 though lawmakers have allowed a reduction in
the standard of proof in nominally civil proceedings in which economic sanctions are imposed.25 Beyond the crime facts, sentencing
factors related to culpability, such as a person’s criminal history,
may be determined after the guilt phase of criminal trials with the
prosecution’s burden set at a preponderance of the evidence.26
Offense Seriousness
Crime Facts, Criminal Cases—Prosecution, BRD
Crime Facts, Civil Cases—Prosecution, Less than BRD
Sentencing Factors—Prosecution, Preponderance

Shifting to the punishment-severity side of the scale, we look to
the dollar value of the economic sanctions. For fines and fees, the
allowable dollar value is set out in statute, either within a range or
22. 524 U.S. 321, 336-37 (1998).
23. See, e.g., id. at 337.
24. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970); see also Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296,
303-04 (2004) (holding that at sentencing a judge may rely only on facts established by the
guilty plea to set the range of sentence available). Lawmakers may choose to reduce or shift
the burden for crime facts related to affirmative defenses. See Patterson v. New York, 432
U.S. 197 (1977).
25. See infra notes 143-46 and accompanying text.
26. See Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 226-27 (1998).
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at a specific amount.27 The dollar value of a restitution award is
established at a hearing, with the burden of proving a compensable
amount on the prosecution, typically by a preponderance.28 Forfeitures operate differently. Forfeitures occur when the government
seizes cash or property with a suspected link to criminal activity
and converts the ownership interests for its own use.29 Though the
government is required to prove the relationship between the cash
or property seized and the purported crime,30 for punishment severity purposes, the dollar value is simply dependent upon the
amount of cash or the liquidated value of the property seized.
Punishment severity may also include the financial effect of the
sanctions—the ability of a person and his or her family to pay fines,
fees, or restitution or to absorb the loss of forfeited cash or property.
The Court has not yet resolved whether financial effect is relevant
27. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6611(a)-(b) (2012). This Article uses the term “fees” to
refer to administrative fees—such as court costs, warrant fees, indigent defense fees, and the
like. See, e.g., Beth A. Colgan, The Excessive Fines Clause: Challenging the Modern Debtors’
Prison, 65 UCLA L. REV. 2, 35-36 (2018). For ease of reference, the term is also used here to
capture what are commonly referred to as “surcharges” or “assessments,” which are typically
a flat amount added to or a percentage of base fine amounts that operate like fines.
Surcharges may be placed in general funds or be targeted for particular purposes. See id. at
32-33.
28. CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL34138, RESTITUTION IN FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES 20 (2019); see
also Hester v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 509, 510 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (explaining
that restitution requires finding additional facts not established in the guilt phase). There is
an open question as to whether the facts used to establish restitution must be decided by a
jury beyond a reasonable doubt because an award of restitution necessarily raises the statutory maximum sentence from zero dollars to the compensation amount. See id. (positing that
the Court should consider whether restitution falls within the jury trial and standard of proof
requirements set out in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000)). That inquiry, which is
based on the Sixth Amendment jury trial right, is outside of the scope of this Article.
29. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 982(a).
30. See, e.g., id.; 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a); 21 U.S.C. §§ 853(a), 881(a). The burden of proof
required to establish the “nexus” between the cash and property to be forfeited and the alleged
criminal activity varies across jurisdictions. See infra notes 143-46 and accompanying text.
The Court has not been asked to determine the constitutionality of using a standard less than
beyond a reasonable doubt to address that question, nor has it opined on whether the question
of nexus—which does not fit within offense seriousness or punishment severity used to measure gross disproportionality—is relevant to the excessiveness inquiry. See Austin v. United
States, 509 U.S. 602, 623, 625-26 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (raising the question of
whether the excessiveness of instrumentality forfeitures should be ascertained through an
examination of the nexus between the property and offense). At least one lower court has
adopted a nexus test and also spoken to the question of burdens, placing the burden on the
government to establish nexus so that the property owners would not “be forced to prove a
negative.” In re King Properties, 635 A.2d 128, 133 (Pa. 1993).
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to measuring punishment severity.31 It has, however, suggested that
it leans favorably to its inclusion.32 Therefore, in the interest of providing an analysis robust enough to capture this potential aspect of
the proportionality inquiry, this Article presumes that the Court
will determine that financial effect is relevant. But the question remains: Who should hold the various burdens of proof and by what
standard should the determination of financial effect be made?
Punishment Severity
Dollar value of fines & fees—Statutory
Dollar value of restitution—Prosecution, Preponderance
Dollar value of forfeitures—Value of Cash or Property
Financial Effect—?

Once the component parts of offense seriousness and punishment
severity are established, a court must engage in the excessiveness
inquiry by discerning whether the punishment severity outweighs
offense seriousness to such an extent that it is rendered grossly
disproportionate.33 As with financial effect, the Court has not yet
had the opportunity to ascertain the appropriate assignment of burdens on that question, and so both assignments are currently
missing from the doctrine. This Article will next address the question of how to ensure those assignments are in keeping with due
process.
B. Reconciling Mathews and Medina
For both the preliminary issue of financial effect and the overall determination of disproportionality, a question remains as to
what factors should be considered to ensure that the assignment
31. Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 688 (2019) (citing United States v. Bajakajian, 524
U.S. 321, 340 n.15 (1998)) (noting the Court had not yet taken a position); see also Colo. Dep’t
of Lab. & Emp. v. Dami Hosp., L.L.C., 442 P.3d 94, 96, 101-02 (Colo. 2019), cert. denied, 140
S. Ct. 849 (2020) (holding that financial effect is relevant to excessiveness). At the time of
publication, the Court was again considering taking up this question. See Rosales-Gonzales
v. United States, No. 21-5305 (2021).
32. Beth A. Colgan & Nicholas M. McLean, Financial Hardship and the Excessive Fines
Clause: Assessing the Severity of Property Forfeitures After Timbs, 129 YALE L.J.F. 430, 43337 (2020).
33. United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 336-37 (1998).
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of burdens comports with fundamental fairness. The Court has
typically approached the question of whether such an assignment
satisfies due process under the test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge,
which balances governmental interests, private interests, and the
extent to which the assignment will contribute to or reduce the risk
of an erroneous decision.34 After nearly two decades of relying on the
Mathews test in both criminal and civil matters, the Court mandated a more restrictive test in the criminal sphere in Medina v.
California.35 This distinction is particularly relevant here because
lawmakers employ economic sanctions in both criminal and civil
settings, and the Court has held that the Excessive Fines Clause’s
protections extend to both so long as the sanctions are at least
partially punitive.36
In Medina, the Court held that the analytical framework for
assessing procedural rules, including the assignment of burdens of
proof, must include an examination of historical practice for the
purpose of establishing whether a procedure “offends some principle
of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as
to be ranked as fundamental,” thereby necessitating an inquiry into
early English and American practices.37
In so holding, the Court acknowledged that it had employed the
Mathews test in two prior cases involving criminal procedure.38 In
the first, United States v. Raddatz, the Court upheld the Federal
Magistrates Act, which allowed a magistrate to make findings and
recommendations related to a motion to suppress a confession as
involuntarily obtained.39 Mr. Raddatz raised several claims, one of
which was a due process challenge to the statute.40 The Raddatz
34. See, e.g., Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979) (citing Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).
35. Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 443, 445-46 (1992).
36. Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 604, 621-22 (1993) (holding that the Excessive
Fines Clause applies to economic sanctions, including civil forfeitures, nominally labeled civil
so long as they are at least partially punitive); see also United States v. James Daniel Good
Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 53-54 (1993) (using the Mathews test to assess the constitutionality
of civil forfeiture proceedings).
37. Medina, 505 U.S. at 445 (quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201-02 (1977)).
38. Id. at 444-45.
39. 447 U.S. 667, 683-84 (1980).
40. The other claims involved the voluntariness of a confession, statutory interpretation
of the Federal Magistrates Act, and a constitutional claim based on Article III. See generally
id.
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Court framed the challenge as falling under the three-part Mathews
test.41 It then engaged in a fairly shallow inquiry as to the private
interest prong, pointing to several prior cases in which it had held
that a person’s interests were reduced when the question at stake
in a particular criminal proceeding is tangential to the ultimate
determination of guilt.42 In dissent, Justice Marshall chided the
majority for failing to fully engage with the significant private
interests at stake in ensuring that people were not deprived of
liberty on the basis of involuntary confessions.43 He also took issue
with how the majority’s opinion fell short with respect to the third
Mathews factor regarding the risk of error, positing that the risk is
heightened when a judge must later rely on a magistrate’s written
recommendation as to voluntariness rather than personally being
able to judge the credibility of witnesses.44 But, rather than faulting
the Raddatz majority for insufficiently engaging with the Mathews
factors, the Medina Court described Raddatz as having not applied
Mathews at all, stating that it merely “cited to the Mathews
balancing test ... but did not explicitly rely upon it in conducting the
due process analysis.”45
In addition to Raddatz, to reject the Mathews approach to assessing whether criminal procedural rules meet due process, the
Medina Court also had to contend with its prior reliance on the test
in Ake v. Oklahoma, in which it held that indigent defendants had
a right to appointed psychiatric experts in cases in which insanity
is a significant factor.46 To do so, Justice Kennedy, writing for the
Medina majority explained: “The holding in Ake can be understood
as an expansion of earlier due process cases holding that an indigent criminal defendant is entitled to the minimum assistance
necessary to assure him ‘a fair opportunity to present his defense’
and ‘to participate meaningfully in [the] judicial proceeding.’”47 Yet,
that language was plucked from the Ake opinion just before the Ake
Court explained that the concept of minimal assistance was
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 677-81.
Id.
Id. at 699-702 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id.
Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 444-45 (1992).
See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77-85 (1985).
Medina, 505 U.S. at 444-45 (alteration in original) (quoting Ake, 470 U.S. at 76).
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intended “merely to begin our inquiry,” and that the question of
whether psychiatric experts must be provided had to be assessed
under the Mathews three-part framework.48 The Ake Court then
diligently addressed each component, recognizing that the governmental interests were limited given the minimal administrative cost
of supplying psychiatric experts, that the private interest at stake—
life or liberty—was “almost uniquely compelling,” and that it was
important to have such experts weigh in on the inherently imprecise
question of sanity in order to reduce the risk of error.49 In light of its
full reliance on the Mathews test, the Medina Court’s assessment
that it was “not at all clear that Mathews was essential” to the Ake
decision is at best baffling.50
The Medina majority’s rejection of the Mathews approach came
under immediate fire. In a concurrence joined by Justice Souter,
Justice O’Connor noted that the Court “obviously applied” the
Mathews test in Ake and that the test “remains a useful guide in
due process cases.”51 Likewise, in a dissent joined by Justice
Stevens, Justice Blackmun wrote that he was “not sure what the
Court mean[t]” when it claimed a lack of reliance on Mathews by the
Raddatz and Ake Courts, “because both cases unquestionably set
forth the full Mathews test and evaluated the interests.”52
What is more, the Medina opinion leaves the role of the nowmandated historical inquiry unresolved. The majority opinion
suggests that history serves as a sort of gatekeeper, by which a
modern procedure must be left untouched unless it goes against a
long-standing historical practice.53 But in its actual employment of
that framework, history did not serve as a gatekeeper as suggested.
The legal issue being addressed was whether a California law allocating the burden of persuasion to establish incompetency to stand
trial to the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence satisfied

48. Ake, 470 U.S. at 76-77.
49. Id. at 78-83.
50. Medina, 505 U.S. at 444.
51. Id. at 453 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
52. Id. at 462 n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
53. Id. at 445-46 (majority opinion) (quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201-02
(1977)) (proposing that a criminal procedural rule “is not subject to proscription under the Due
Process Clause unless” it violates historical practice).
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due process.54 The majority began its analysis by examining early
English and American history, but—upon finding “no historical
basis for concluding that the allocation of the burden of proving
incompetence to the defendant violates due process”— rather than
ending its inquiry, the majority took up consideration of “whether
the rule transgresses any recognized principle of ‘fundamental
fairness’ in operation.”55 In doing so, the majority effectively engaged in a Mathews-like balancing test. It distinguished other cases
assigning the burden of persuasion to the government on the
grounds that in those cases the government was seeking to introduce unconstitutionally obtained evidence, whereas here it had
committed no such violation—suggesting comparatively heightened governmental interests in this setting.56 The majority also
determined that the risk of an erroneous competency decision to the
individual was low given that trial counsel would be available to
protect his or her interests, including by re-raising the competency
question if necessary.57 And it considered the limited risk that a
preponderance of evidence standard would result in erroneous
determinations of competency given that it would only affect “a
narrow class of cases where the evidence is in equipoise; that is,
where the evidence that a defendant is competent is just as strong
as the evidence that he is incompetent.”58 As Justice Blackmun
noted in dissent, “it is clear that the Court ends up engaging in a
balancing inquiry not meaningfully distinguishable from that of the
Mathews v. Eldridge test it earlier appears to forswear.”59
Later opinions have also left open the question of what role
history plays in the due process analysis. Less than six months after
the Court announced Medina, it suggested that historical and contemporary practices were on equal footing.60 Four years later, a plurality of the Court described historical practice as the “primary

54. Id. at 439.
55. Id. at 446-48.
56. Id. at 451-52.
57. Id. at 450-51.
58. Id. at 449.
59. Id. at 462 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
60. See Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 32 (1992) (citing Medina, 505 U.S. at 446-47)
(“Respondent cites no historical tradition or contemporary practice indicating that Kentucky’s
scheme violates due process.”).
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guide in determining whether the principle in question is fundamental.”61 Unsurprisingly, the Court engaged in no historical
inquiry in one case involving procedural rules related to DNA testing requests, which could not possibly have had a historical counterpart.62 And in the three remaining cases in which the Court
purported to apply Medina,63 it described the historical inquiry as
merely probative of whether a procedure was fundamentally fair,
considering it alongside contemporary practices and concerns.64 For
example, in Cooper v. Oklahoma, the Court preserved the Medina
Court’s determination that the burden of persuasion could be placed
on a person claiming incompetency to stand trial but struck down
a statute raising that burden to a clear and convincing evidence
standard. It did so by looking both to historical evidence and modern
conceptions of fairness, taking guidance from a series of cases in
which the Court expressly relied on the Mathews test to assign
burdens of proof.65
This morass raises the question of whether the Mathews approach
to ascertaining fundamental fairness can be reconciled with the
Medina Court’s interest in using historical evidence, whether that
be as a gatekeeper or simply a consideration alongside contemporary indicators of fairness.
As becomes clear by examining the question through the lens of
the Excessive Fines Clause, allowing history to serve as a gatekeeper is in conflict with the due process goal of fundamental
fairness. The Medina approach—in which due process is only
61. Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 43 (1996) (plurality opinion).
62. Dist. Att’y’s Off. for the Third Jud. Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 69 (2009).
63. In its two most recent decisions, the Court declined to take up the extent to which
Mathews and Medina control questions involving criminal procedure. Nelson v. Colorado, 137
S. Ct. 1249, 1255, 1256 n.9 (2017) (applying the Mathews test to a procedure by which people
may seek return of monies collected for economic sanctions imposed to a conviction that has
subsequently been reversed or vacated because, without a valid conviction, criminal processes
are not implicated); id. at 1258 (Alito, J., concurring) (arguing that the Medina test should
have been used because the economic sanctions at issue were originally imposed in criminal
cases); Kaley v. United States, 571 U.S. 320, 333-34 (2014) (declining to resolve the question
of whether Mathews or Medina applied to a procedure precluding people from challenging
grand jury probable cause determinations at pretrial, post-restraint hearings, reasoning that
the claimant would lose even if the Mathews test applied).
64. See Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 627-29 (2005); Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348,
356-66 (1996); Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 407-11 (1993).
65. 517 U.S. at 356-66.
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implicated if a modern procedure conflicts with a longstanding
historical protection—necessarily requires proof of protective procedural practices within the historical record in order to claim a
right to such a protection today.66 That approach fails to account for
the ways in which historical processes might be compromised by the
very abuses a clause is designed to protect against.
The story of the Excessive Fines Clause is set against a centurieslong history of lawmakers designing systems that allow the government to extract revenue through the use of disproportionate
economic sanctions rather than taxation.67 The roots of the Clause
date back at least to Magna Carta,68 which responded to such
abuses by placing two limitations on the imposition of amercements,
which were predecessors to modern fines69:
A free man shall be amerced for a small fault only according to
the measure thereof, and for a great crime according to its
magnitude, saving his position; and in like manner, a merchant
saving his trade, and a villein saving his tillage, if they should
fall under Our mercy.70

Though Magna Carta was designed to protect against abusive
economic punishments, in the centuries that followed, English
monarchs repeatedly ignored its guarantees, including most notoriously through the use of the Star Chamber. Among other abuses,
its jurists employed extraordinary fines to three ends: to drain
power from Parliament by creating a source of revenue that
undermined its taxing authority, to personally enrich monarchs and
nobles in good standing, and to severely punish those who spoke out
against the Church or Crown.71 Even jurists perceived as less
66. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
67. See Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 694 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring).
68. As Justice Thomas has noted, the proportionality requirement embodied in the Excessive Fines Clause arguably predates Magna Carta and extends back to the Charter of
Liberties of Henry I from the year 1101. See id. at 693.
69. Beth A. Colgan, Reviving the Excessive Fines Clause, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 277, 296-97
(2014).
70. Magna Carta, ch. 20 (1215), in A. E. DICK HOWARD, MAGNA CARTA: TEXT & COMMENTARY 42 (rev. ed. 1998).
71. See Timbs, 139 S. Ct. at 688; id. at 693-95 (Thomas, J., concurring); Brief for Eighth
Amendment Scholars as Amici Curiae Supporting Neither Party, Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct.
682 (2019) (No. 17-1091), 2018 WL 4522295.
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beholden to the monarchy appeared willing to impose heavy fines.
Take, for example, Sir Edward Coke, who has been heralded as a
“Challenger of Kings,” due to his willingness to push back against
the abuses of the Star Chamber while serving as Chief Justice of the
Court of Common Pleas and the King’s Bench.72 Coke also recognized both Magna Carta and the English common law as restricting
the imposition of excessive economic sanctions.73 Yet, existing
records also paint Coke as particularly adamant about the imposition of exorbitant fines, even as compared to his fellow jurists.74
While it does appear that fines assessed during the period in which
the Star Chamber operated were occasionally remitted,75 it is
72. Charles H. Randall, Jr., Sir Edward Coke and the Privilege Against SelfIncrimination, 8 S.C. L. REV. 417, 417-19 (1956) (regarding Coke’s efforts to end the oath ex
officio, a tool for prosecuting heresy, and against the use of torture).
73. Coke served as a jurist prior to the adoption of the English Bill of Rights in which the
prohibition against “excessive fines” was first articulated. See infra note 77. Because Magna
Carta spoke of amercements, Coke understood its protections to be limited to amercements
imposed by juries, but posited that the common law afforded the same protections against
fines imposed by judges. THE REPORTS OF SIR EDWARD COKE, KT., VOL. 11, 43-44 (E. & R.
Nutt, & R. Gosling 1728) (Richard Godfrey’s Case, Mich. 12 Jac. I.) (explaining that “the
Reasonableness of the Fine shall be judged by the Justices; and if it appears to them to be
excessive, it is ... prohibited by the Common Law” and citing Magna Carta for the proposition
that “[e]xcessive amercement is against the law”); see also Sollom Emlyn, Preface to the
Second Edition of the State Trials, in T.B. HOWELL, A COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS
AND PROCEEDINGS FOR HIGH TREASON AND OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS FROM THE
EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE YEAR 1783, at xxxv (London, T.C. Honsend, Peterborough-Court,
Fleet Street 1816) (citing Coke in describing Magna Carta as applying to amercements and
the common law as applying to fines).
74. See JOHN SOUTHERDEN BURN, THE STAR CHAMBER: NOTICES OF THE COURT AND ITS
PROCEEDINGS; WITH A FEW ADDITIONAL NOTES OF THE HIGH COMMISSION 86 (London, J.
Russell Smith 1870) (describing a case in which the Earl and Countess of Suffolk and Sir John
Bingley were sentenced to fines ranging between £30,000 and £2,000, despite Coke’s vote for
fines of £100,000 and £5,000, respectively); id. at 87 (describing the case of Sir Henry
Yelverton, the attorney general, who was convicted “of passing some clauses in the City
Charter, not agreeable to the King’s warrant,” for which he was fined £4,000 despite Coke’s
declaration that the fine should have been £6,000). One commentator speaking on abuses by
jurists in the era remarked:
Such methods as these should be below men of honour, not to say men of
conscience: yet in the perusal of this Work, such persons will too often arise to
view; and I could wish for the credit of the Law, that that great Oracle of it, the
Lord Chief Justice Coke, had given less reason to be numbered among this sort.
Emlyn, supra note 73, at xxiv.
75. See, e.g., BURN, supra note 74, at 54 (noting a remission of the fine imposed in the case
of a sheriff who refused to execute a heretic because the sheriff had acted on “the advice of
divers gentlemen of worship of the county, some being learned men and justices of the Peace,
and as he was no favourer of heresies”); id. at 84 & n.2 (discussing the pardoning of two young
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unsurprising that procedural rules for making a request for remission—which would cut so against the modus operandi—are
absent from the historical records of the time, including in The
Institutes of the Laws of England, Coke’s seminal writings on the
English common law.76
The abuses of the Star Chamber were mirrored in later practices
despite additional recognition of constitutional limitations on excessive sanctions. The prohibition against the imposition of excessive fines in the English Bill of Rights arose out of reactions to
the Star Chamber,77 and was in turn adopted verbatim, first in the
Virginia Declaration of Rights,78 and ultimately in the Eighth
Amendment.79 Yet, like Magna Carta in England before it, the Excessive Fines Clause was at times ignored on American soil.80
Though the use of the penal law—and particularly vagrancy codes—
to control Black people pre-date the Civil War,81 a particularly
notorious example of lawmaker behavior in contradiction to the
Clause is found in the post-antebellum South through the adoption
of the Black Codes, a series of laws applicable explicitly or through
practice only to Black people.82 Following trials that were often at
men convicted for dueling because King James wished to make a symbolic gesture of mercy
on his first appearance at the court); id. at 140 (noting that the fines and imprisonment
imposed had been pardoned “on account of their poverty”).
76. See generally EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND: CONCERNING HIGH TREASON, AND OTHER PLEAS OF THE CROWN, AND CRIMINAL
CASES (London, M. Fleshner 1644).
77. An Act Declaring the Rights and Liberties of the Subject, and Settling the Succession
of the Crown 1689, 1 W. & M. c. 2, § 11; see also Emlyn, supra note 73, at xxxv-vi (“It was the
non-observance of these Rules, which occasioned the dissolution of the Star Chamber.”);
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 502 (1969).
78. VA. CONST. OF 1776, art. I, § 9.
79. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; see also Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 688 (2019);
Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 267 (1989).
80. See JULIUS GOEBEL JR. & T. RAYMOND NAUGHTON, LAW ENFORCEMENT IN COLONIAL
NEW YORK: A STUDY IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (1664-1776) 702 (Julius Goebel Jr., ed. 1944)
(explaining that during the colonial period, records of fineable offenses show “signs of indulgence and this, indeed, chiefly in relation to prosecutions by Crown informations which
were viewed with a jaundiced eye”).
81. RISA GOLUBOFF, VAGRANT NATION: POLICE POWER, CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND THE
MAKING OF THE 1960S 115 (2016).
82. See generally DOUGLAS A. BLACKMON, SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME: THE REENSLAVEMENT OF BLACK AMERICANS FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO WORLD WAR II (2008); see also
Timbs, 139 S. Ct. at 688-89 (discussing the use of the Black Codes); id. at 697-98 (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (same).
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best a sham, fines were imposed and the debts sold to private
parties who then extracted labor from Black people in practices that
mirrored enslavement.83 Again, it would be surprising if the historical record of a system designed to extract wealth and labor without meaningful process were to include procedural rules that would
undercut those efforts.
In both the English and early American histories, there are also
records of abusive practices related to economic sanctions imposed
in capital offenses that would make the existence of protective procedures surprising. In addition to execution, capital crimes were
punished with partial or full forfeiture of one’s estate, by which the
person’s property interests were transferred to the government.84
The record is mixed as to the actual prevalence of these practices;
there are some indications that statutes requiring forfeiture of
estate went unenforced or if imposed were later reversed.85 But the
record also suggests that these forfeitures were seen as a literal fate
worse than death, leading lawmakers to take troubling steps to
secure those revenues. For example, in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, English criminal trials involved the bringing
forward of the accused who was questioned as to how they would
plead; a refusal to plead meant being “subjected to the infamous
83. See Timbs, 139 S. Ct. at 688-89.
84. See J.F. ARCHBOLD, A COMPLETE PRACTICAL TREATISE: CRIMINAL PROCEDURE,
PLEADING AND EVIDENCE, IN INDICTABLE CASES 633 (New York, Banks & Brothers 8th ed.
1880); JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE CRIMINAL LAW, VOL. 1 §§ 622, 628 (Boston, Little, Brown and Co. 1856); 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 374-81 (1769); 1 JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF
ENGLAND 487-89 (London, Macmillan & Co. 1883). Punishment may also involve corruption
of blood, which precluded heirs to the person convicted from inheriting the person’s property.
BLACKSTONE, supra, at 388-89; STEPHEN, supra, at 487-89. These economic sanctions would
undoubtedly constitute fines under the Court’s interpretation of the Excessive Fines Clause.
See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
85. See, e.g., GOEBEL & NAUGHTON, supra note 80, at 712-13 (explaining that though
mandated by the Crown, forfeitures of estate were not enforced in New York “due to a variety
of factors, not the least of which was the failure to set up in New York an establishment comparable to the English Exchequer whereby the exaction of forfeitures would be assured” and
because the money flowing to the Crown “tended to promote ... indifference”); id. at 713
(explaining that there was use of forfeiture of estate following the Leisler Rebellion, but that
at least some properties were returned to the defendants’ families or never seized, and other
properties were ultimately restored after an act of the New York assembly); Colgan, supra
note 69, at 332-33 (describing the large-scale remission of forfeitures of estate that had been
imposed following the Revolutionary War).
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peine forte et dure, wherein weights were laid upon them until they
pleaded or expired; the recalcitrant perished, but, not having been
convicted, they avoided forfeiture.”86 In addition, the lure of forfeiture revenues could also result in increased prosecutions. In
colonial New York, for example, officials attempted to use forfeiture
of estate for economic gain, instituting “prosecutions in order that
the debts of the Province might be satisfied from the forfeitures.”87
It would be surprising indeed to find that the officials who devised
methods of torture to push people toward accepting capital sentences or who drummed up prosecutions to resolve fiscal downturns
had also built into these systems burdens of proof or other procedures that would protect people from such wrongs.
In other words, this history of abusive practices by the very government actors that would bear responsibility for creating procedural protections shows the danger in employing the Medina Court’s
test in which due process could only be implicated if a modern procedure conflicted with a longstanding historical protection.88 To
avoid a test myopic to such abuses, any use of history should account for how a lack of procedural protections may be the result of
practices that would be in violation of a given constitutional
protection had it been enforced.
Beyond gaps that may exist due to abusive practices, it is critical
to understand that the historical record may be incomplete, not
because a particular practice did not exist, but because it simply
was not recorded. Despite the ubiquitous use of economic
sanctions,89 most surviving historical materials focus elsewhere.
Economic sanctions such as fines (directed in some cases to victims
as a form of restitution), costs, and limited forfeitures were most
commonly employed as punishment for misdemeanor offenses.90
86. THOMAS ANDREW GREEN, VERDICT ACCORDING TO CONSCIENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON THE
ENGLISH CRIMINAL TRIAL JURY 1200-1800 15 (1985); see also J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION
TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 580-81 (3d ed. 1990).
87. GOEBEL & NAUGHTON, supra note 80, at 714.
88. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
89. GOEBEL & NAUGHTON, supra note 80, at 709 (“The fine, as we have indicated, was the
sanction par excellence of provincial criminal justice.”); see also S. Union Co. v. United States,
567 U.S. 343, 349 (2012) (“Fines were by far the most common form of noncapital punishment
in colonial America.”).
90. See BISHOP, supra note 84, § 626; 1 J. CHITTY, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL
LAW 810 (London, A.J. Valpy, Tookes Court, Chancery Lane 1816); Emlyn, supra note 73, at
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They were also available punishments in felony cases—in particular, the partial or full forfeiture of estate discussed above,91 or as
part of lesser punishments for people convicted of a felony for the
first time whose executions were excused by benefit of clergy.92 Yet,
treatises and scholarly works regarding practices related to both
criminal and evidentiary law in the seventeenth, eighteenth, and
nineteenth centuries primarily focus on treason, felony offenses, and
the punishments they more often carried, including execution or
transportation (a form of banishment).93 Similarly, many treatises
and scholarly interventions regarding historical practices focus
heavily on descriptions of the substantive criminal law or on pretrial and trial (but not sentencing) practices and burdens.94 Further,
not only have many records been lost to time, those that have
survived often contain little information about procedure.95 While
these materials provide some insight related to burdens of proof
generally, they are not specific to the question at hand.
The record may also be incomplete due to changes in litigation
strategy and expectations of the judiciary with respect to addressing
xxxv; STEPHEN, supra note 84, at 490.
91. See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
92. Benefit of clergy was a widespread practice, the scope and availability of which varied
over time, but which allowed a reduction in punishment for people convicted for the first time
thus leaving it to judges to rely on other forms of punishment, including fines, for clergiable
offenses. See BISHOP, supra note 84, §§ 622-23; CHITTY, supra note 90, at 711; STEPHEN, supra
note 84, at 458, 462-66.
93. See BISHOP, supra note 84, §§ 622, 641; CHITTY, supra note 90, at 701-05; LAWRENCE
M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 265, 275, 561, 576 (4th ed. 2019); STEPHEN, supra
note 84, at 458, 482; see also John H. Langbein, The Criminal Trial Before the Lawyers, 45 U.
CHI. L. REV. 263, 266 (1978) (“Treason was also unique in being subject to express standards
of proof, on account of a succession of statutes that mostly required two witnesses.”).
94. See, e.g., BISHOP, supra note 84, §§ 212, 318, 355-56; CHITTY, supra note 90, at 129,
186, 224. See generally 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 84; JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW (Boston, Little, Brown and Co. 1898);
FRANCIS WHARTON, A TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (Philadelphia,
Kay & Brother, 7th & rev. ed. 1874); JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW (1904); J. M. Beattie, Scales of Justice: Defense Counsel
and the English Criminal Trial in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, 9 L. & HIST. REV.
221, 248 (1991); Anthony A. Morano, A Reexamination of the Development of the Reasonable
Doubt Rule, 55 B.U. L. REV. 507 (1975) (arguing that the beyond the reasonable doubt standard is lower than the standard applied prior to 1700); BARBARA J. SHAPIRO, “BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT” AND “PROBABLE CAUSE”: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE ANGLOAMERICAN LAW OF EVIDENCE (1991) (focusing on felonies and pre-trial and trial proceedings).
95. GOEBEL & NAUGHTON, supra note 80, at 723-24 (discussing how available records were
“usually silent” about the procedures used to collect fines).
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claims and documenting judicial analyses. For example, many early
American excessive fines challenges were raised facially, and so
necessarily would not involve the assignment of burdens for assessing excessiveness in an as-applied setting.96 Further, in many
available cases, excessive fines challenges were raised but not addressed,97 were not reached due to an insufficient record of the evidence upon which the conviction stood,98 contained no meaningful
analysis,99 or did not state explicitly what burdens of proof were
employed.100
In addition to accounting for potential distortions and gaps in the
record, any reliance on history must be measured realistically, keeping in mind that no single understanding on any particular point
may have ever existed. As Bernadette Meyler has written, a proper
examination of the historical record will reveal a “disunified field”
of evidence—in other words, that common law practices were seldom
uniform and shifted over time and so may point in different directions with respect to a given question.101 That, of course,
96. See, e.g., Baldwin v. State, 75 Ga. 482, 485 (1885); State v. Cannady, 78 N.C. 539, 544
(1878); March v. State, 35 Tex. 115, 116 (1871); State v. Davidson, 44 Mo. App. 513, 519
(1891). As is the case today, facial challenges are a uniquely tough row for defendants to hoe.
Compare United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987) (rejecting a facial challenge to the
federal Bail Reform Act and noting that “respondents have failed to shoulder their heavy burden”), with, e.g., In re MacDonald, 33 P. 18, 21 (Wyo. 1893) (“in order to declare the law
unconstitutional,” the court must find “that the punishment provided by the law is so disproportionate to the offense as to shock the moral sense of the people.”). One excessive fines
challenge decided at the close of the nineteenth century even stated that defendants must
show facial unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Lubee, 45 A. 520, 521 (Me.
1899). In many of these cases, however, the early appellate courts emphasized that even if facially valid, sentencing judges were mandated to ensure that fines fell within constitutional
limits as applied. See, e.g., infra note 239.
97. See, e.g., Tilley v. Savannah, Fla. & W. R.R. Co., 5 F. 641, 650, 659-60 (C.C.S.D. Ga.
1881); Prentice v. Weston, 118 N.E. 720, 721-22 (N.Y. 1888); Burger v. State, 26 S.C.L. (1
McMul.) 410, 418 (Ct. App. 1841).
98. See State v. Sheppard, 32 S.E. 146, 146-47 (S.C. 1899); Blydenburgh v. Miles, 39 Conn.
484, 496 (1872); Wingfield v. Commonwealth, 1 Ky. Op. 585, 585-86 (Ct. App. 1867).
99. See, e.g., In re Stone, 41 A. 658, 658 (R.I. 1898) (per curiam) (stating only that the fine
imposed was “not so clearly excessive” as to be unconstitutional); Ex parte Keeler, 23 S.E. 865,
668 (S.C. 1896) (“In our opinion, the fine imposed on the defendant was not excessive.”); State
v. Huff, 40 N.W. 720, 722 (Iowa 1888) (“It is claimed that the punishment is excessive. We do
not so regard it.”); Bradshaw v. State, 50 S.W. 359, 360 (Tex. Crim. App. 1899) (“We do not
think the verdict of the jury is at all excessive.”).
100. See, e.g., State v. Price, 39 N.W. 291, 293 (Iowa 1888).
101. Bernadette Meyler, Towards a Common Law Originalism, 59 STAN. L. REV. 551, 55658, 569 (2006).
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undermines the idea that history can provide determinative answers to the type of precise questions often raised in constitutional
litigation, including what party carried the burdens of proof in the
excessive fines context.
Again, the historical record as it relates to excessive fines claims
provides examples of this form of limitation. The record is in discord
as to judicial discretion to impose fines, with some records indicating that even if lawmakers were to set a mandatory fine in statute,
judges had the authority to remit it if it were constitutionally excessive, whereas other sources suggest that judges had no such
discretion, pushing the question of remission to pardons and related
processes.102 As another example, an accounting of practices in
colonial New York indicates that judges within the same system
took varying approaches to the imposition and collection of fines.103
These inconsistencies warrant caution when relying upon early
procedures to establish fundamental fairness in today’s system.
In sum, history may prove useful if it tells us something about
governmental or private interests or how the risk that a particular
assignment of burdens or other procedural rule would increase the
likelihood of an erroneous determination so long as we are honest
about its limitations. We can do so by recognizing the ways in which
governmental self-interest may distort the record, by acknowledging
where the record is incomplete, and by identifying anachronisms.
We might think of this approach as a question of weight rather than
admissibility. Where the historical record is suspect, silent, or inconsistent, it should be afforded little weight, leaving contemporary
considerations of fundamental fairness to take center stage.104 As
the historical evidence becomes more reliable, clearer, and more
targeted to the question at hand, it can play a larger role, working
in conjunction with modern considerations to ascertain the best
path forward.105
In other words, the Mathews-Medina conundrum can be reconciled by allowing history to serve as a partner, rather than a gatekeeper, to contemporary understandings of fundamental fairness.
102.
103.
104.
105.

See infra notes 237-41, 248-53 and accompanying text.
GOEBEL & NAUGHTON, supra note 80, at 724-25.
See, e.g., infra Part II.B.
See, e.g., infra Part II.C-D.
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The reconciliation proposed here would use the Mathews three-part
test as a frame for assessing the fundamental fairness of a criminal
procedure: (1) will the assignment of burdens significantly interfere
with an important government function, (2) what risks does a
person face if the determination is wrong, and (3) how do burdens
of proof affect the decision maker’s ability to reach a proper
conclusion?106 Within that analysis, history may prove useful, to the
extent it provides insight into how those same concerns were
ameliorated—or not—through criminal processes used across time.
With that approach in mind, we turn now to the assignment of
burdens to the questions of financial effect and disproportionality in
the excessive fines realm.
II. THE ASSIGNMENT OF BURDENS
“Burden of proof ”—singular—is a misnomer. What follows identifies and analyzes four separate assignments encompassed within
the phrase107: the burden to raise the claim; the burden of producing
evidence relevant to the claim; the burden of persuasion, which is
really the “risk of nonpersuasion” on the issue108; and the standard
of proof, which serves “to instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication.”109
Standards of proof include, for example, the beyond a reasonable
doubt standard for establishing guilt in a criminal case, and the
clear and convincing or preponderance of the evidence standards in
many other settings.110
As detailed above, the framework for assessing the assignment of
burdens employed in this Article is taken from the Mathews test,
which looks to three indicators of fundamental fairness: the manner
106. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
107. Other scholars have broken the concept of burden into three parts (the burdens of
production and persuasion, and the standard of persuasion). See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, You
Prove It! Why Should I?, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 691, 691-92 (1994). As detailed further
below, it is necessary to also break out the burden of raising the claim in order to capture the
way in which lawmakers can design systems that enhance the possibility of governmental
abuse. See infra Part II.B.
108. Solum, supra note 107, at 691-92.
109. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
110. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979).
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in which the assignment will affect governmental interests, the
private interests at stake, and the risk of an erroneous determination—in this case both the determination of financial effect and the
ultimate assessment of disproportionality.111 Here, the governmental and private interests apply across each of the four burden types,
so they are set forth at the start. For the third factor—the risk of an
erroneous determination—the four iterations of the burden of proof
are considered in turn, examining both contemporary indicators of
fundamental fairness and historical evidence, subject to the limitations noted above, and concluding with a proposed assignment for
each burden. In doing so, I distinguish between the preliminary
question of financial effect and the ultimate question of disproportionality, criminal and civil settings, and differences between economic sanction type, where necessary.
A. Interests at Stake in Assigning Burdens
The following details the governmental and private interests at
stake when assigning burdens in relation to Excessive Fines Clause
claims.
1. Governmental Interests
The Court has recognized that “[t]he State, of course, has a fundamental interest in appropriately punishing persons—rich and
poor—who violate its criminal laws.”112 Because the Excessive Fines
Clause applies to both criminal and civil economic sanctions,113 this
analysis necessarily also captures offenses that are generally
understood to constitute minimal wrongdoing for which the government has a reduced interest,114 such as low-level public order

111. See supra Part I.A.
112. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 669 (1983).
113. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
114. Cf. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 754 (1984) (declining to apply the exigency
exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement in a case involving the nighttime
entry into a home to arrest a person for intoxicated driving in part because Wisconsin’s
lawmakers had “chosen to classify the first offense for driving while intoxicated as a
noncriminal, civil forfeiture for which no imprisonment is possible”).

434

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:407

violations, minor traffic offenses, and parking violations.115 In both
criminal and civil settings, the State’s interest in punishing people
for any given behavior is, of course, contestable.116 But for purposes
of this analysis, I assume the government has a legitimate interest
in responding to at least some behaviors in both spheres.
This interest in imposing appropriate punishment for wrongdoing, however, must be contextualized within the long history of
governmental abuse of its prosecutorial power to generate revenue
through economic sanctions as a means of tax-avoidance primarily
borne by the politically vulnerable. As detailed above, these abuses
have been repeated over centuries,117 and there is good reason to
believe that they continue today. Modern lawmakers have long
budgeted in revenues from law enforcement to address budgetary
gaps.118 Further, over the years lawmakers have increased both the
severity and types of economic sanctions imposed119 and in many
jurisdictions have pressured law enforcement to engage in policing

115. See, e.g., Pimentel v. City of Los Angeles, 974 F.3d 917, 922-24 (9th Cir. 2020) (holding
that the Excessive Fines Clause applies to parking tickets and that, while parking laws are
intended to decrease traffic congestion, the violation itself is minor).
116. This contestation occurs on three planes. One focuses on the nature of the response,
challenging the idea that the government has a legitimate interest in imposing punishment,
as opposed to other mechanisms of accountability. See generally, e.g., DANIELLE SERED, UNTIL
WE RECKON: VIOLENCE, MASS INCARCERATION, AND A ROAD TO REPAIR (2019) (regarding
restorative justice practices). The second focuses on the legitimacy of treating particular
behaviors as a form of wrongdoing. See, e.g., Monica Bell, Stephanie Garlock & Alexander
Nabavi-Noori, Toward a Demosprudence of Poverty, 69 DUKE L.J. 1473, 1480-96 (2020)
(regarding various forms of criminalization of poverty). The third questions whether the
public safety benefits of enforcement are insufficient to justify the continuation of systems
that are inextricably intertwined with racial subordination. See generally Brendan D.
Roediger, Abolish Municipal Courts: A Response to Professor Natapoff, 134 HARV. L. REV. F.
213 (2021).
117. See supra notes 67-87 and accompanying text.
118. See, e.g., Thomas A. Garret & Gary A. Wagner, Red Ink in the Rearview Mirror: Local
Fiscal Conditions and the Issuance of Traffic Tickets, 52 J. L. & ECON. 71, 72 (2009) (regarding
such practices in Houston, Nashville, and Washington, D.C.).
119. See, e.g., Karin D. Martin, Monetary Myopia: An Examination of Institutional Response to Revenue from Monetary Sanctions for Misdemeanors, 29 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 630,
636-41 (2018); CAL. LEGIS. ANALYST’S OFF., THE 2017-18 BUDGET: GOVERNOR’S CRIMINAL FINE
AND FEE PROPOSALS 8-10 (Mar. 3, 2017), https://lao.ca.gov/reports/2017/ 3600/Criminal-FineFee-030317.pdf [https://perma.cc/BUQ9-TG7G]; MARCUS NIETO, CAL. RSCH. BUREAU, WHO
PAYS FOR PENALTY PROGRAMS IN CALIFORNIA? 4-5 (Feb. 2006), https://digitalcommons.law
.ggu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1306&context=caldocs_agencies [https://perma.cc/5NZB2HL4].

2021]

THE BURDENS OF THE EXCESSIVE FINES CLAUSE

435

that results in the imposition of economic sanctions.120 Particularly
in jurisdictions in which opportunities to tax are restricted121 or that
are experiencing periods of fiscal distress,122 lawmakers have come
to rely on such revenues to fund a wide variety of public projects.
Those uses may include the operation of courts, law enforcement,
prosecution, indigent defense, probation, and incarceration, as well
as any manner of public service unrelated to legal systems.123 While
a lack of transparency and data collection problems make exact
figures difficult to ascertain, it is clear that local, state, and federal
governments take in billions of dollars annually in revenue from
fines, fees, and forfeitures.124
Further, as has been the case historically,125 law enforcement
practices that generate revenue—including even low-level traffic126
and parking offenses127—are often targeted at politically vulnerable
communities, and particularly heavily policed communities of color.
Recent studies have shown that the percentage of municipal budgets derived from fines and fees increases with the percentage of
people in the community who are Black and Latinx.128 Similarly,
120. See, e.g., Beth A. Colgan, Revenue, Race, and the Limitations of Traffic Enforcement
Reform (forthcoming); Jordan Blair Woods, Traffic Without the Police, 73 STAN. L. REV. 1471,
1514-15 (2021).
121. See, e.g., Patrick Liu, Ryan Nunn & Jay Shambaugh, Nine Facts About Monetary
Sanctions in the Criminal Justice System, BROOKINGS INST. 1, 6-9 (Mar. 2019), https://www.
brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/BailFacts_20190314.pdf [https://perma.cc/W7FR8KFH]; U.S. COMM’N ON CIV. RIGHTS, TARGETED FINES AND FEES AGAINST LOW-INCOME
COMMUNITIES OF COLOR: CIVIL RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS 9 (2017), https://
www.usccr.gov/pubs/2017/Statutory_Enforcement_ Report2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/A75LF4LN].
122. See, e.g., Akheil Singla, Charlotte Kirschner & Samuel B. Stone, Race, Representation,
and Revenue: Reliance on Fines and Forfeitures in City Governments, 56 URB. AFFS. REV.
1132, 1133 (2020) (using U.S. Census Bureau Census of Governments data to show an increase in average reliance on economic sanctions for municipal revenues as the housing market began to burst in 2006 and further increases by 2012).
123. See, e.g., Beth A. Colgan, Beyond Graduation: Economic Sanctions and Structural
Reform, 69 DUKE L.J. 1529, 1539-41 (2020).
124. See id.
125. See supra notes 71-83 and accompanying text.
126. See, e.g., Colgan, supra note 120 (collecting studies regarding racial discrimination in
traffic enforcement); Woods, supra note 120, at 1475-76.
127. Noli Brazil, The Unequal Spatial Distribution of City Government Fines: The Case of
Parking Tickets in Los Angeles, 56 URB. AFFS. REV. 823, 824 (2018) (finding that parking
ticket rates were higher in Black communities).
128. See, e.g., Michael W. Sances & Hye Young You, Who Pays for Government? Descriptive
Representation and Exploitative Revenue Sources, 79 J. POL. 1090, 1090-92 (2017) (assessing
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reviews of forfeiture practices also show disparate enforcement
against Black and Latinx people.129 And while a sufficiently serious
fiscal downturn may moderate racially disproportionate enforcement—a study of traffic ticketing practices in Missouri found that
a decrease in governmental revenue resulted in increased citation
rates of white motorists130—at a minimum these studies raise
questions about the validity of any claimed governmental interest
in imposing financial punishments.
Setting aside, for the moment, these historical and contemporary
practices, when assessing the validity of the government’s interests
we might look to the Court’s approval of either utilitarian or retributive justifications for punishment in the Eighth Amendment
context.131 Full investigation of whether economic sanctions—and
particularly those that are imposed in unmanageable amounts—
actually satisfy those aims is outside of the scope of this Article, but
it is important to note that even without the longstanding risks of
abuse noted above, the question is more complicated than it might
first appear. With respect to the utilitarian goal of deterrence, an
overly protective procedure may result in economic sanctions so low
that the deterrent effect, if any, is reduced. There is, however, mixed

data from nine thousand cities); Singla et al., supra note 122, at 1146-47, 1151 (analyzing a
stratified random sample of ninety-three California municipalities); Dan Kopf, The Fining of
Black America, PRICEONOMICS (2016), https://priceonomics.com/the-fining-of-black-america/
[https://perma.cc/B48H-4CA8] (comparing the 50 municipalities with the highest proportion
of municipal budgets from economic sanctions against all 4,600 municipalities with
populations over 5,000 in the U.S. Census Survey of Local and State Finance and finding that
“[b]y far the largest difference between the median city and cities that receive substantial
revenues from fines is the size of the African American—and, to a lesser extent,
Hispanic—population”) (study tables available at U.S. COMM’N ON CIV. RTS., supra note 121,
at 20-25).
129. See, e.g., Clifton Adcock, Most Police Seizures of Cash Come from Blacks, Hispanics,
OKLA. WATCH (Oct. 28, 2019), https://oklahomawatch.org/2015/10/07/most-police-seizures-ofcash-come-from-blacks-hispanics/ [https://perma.cc/3WUK-3RAM] (examining state-level
forfeitures in ten Oklahoma counties involving seizures of $5,000 or more and finding that 75
percent of cases involved forfeitures against people of color, with 38 percent of proceedings
initiated against Latinx people and 33 percent against Black people).
130. Allison P. Harris, Elliot Ash & Jeffrey Fagan, Fiscal Pressures and Discriminatory
Policing: Evidence from Traffic Stops in Missouri, 5 J. RACE, ETHNICITY & POL. 1, 15-22 (2020).
131. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 999, 1003, 1008-09 (1991) (plurality) (opinion
of Kennedy, J.).
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evidence as to whether economic sanctions actually deter unlawful
acts and increasing evidence that unmanageable economic sanctions motivate unlawful behavior,132 so the government interest in
that respect is less than certain. Retributive interests would also
be undermined by economic sanctions that do not fully account for
the person’s culpability for the offense, though imposing sanctions
beyond a person’s desert would equally offend retributive aims.133
And because economic sanctions implicate not only the financial
condition of the individual upon whom they are imposed, but also
innocent family members and loved ones who lose access to monies
used to pay down economic sanction debt and to forfeited cash or
property, the retributive aim of imposing punishment only on those
who deserve it is undermined.134 But, again, assuming that utilitarian and retributive goals would be properly satisfied in some cases,
fundamental fairness would not command an assignment of burdens
that would fully prevent the government from meeting those
aims.135

132. Compare, e.g., Todd L. Cherry, Financial Penalties as an Alternative Criminal
Sanction: Evidence from Panel Data, 29 ATL. ECON. J. 450, 451-52, 455 (2001) (finding that
fines had a general deterrent effect in four North Carolina counties when applied to seven
serious felonies), with Foster Cook, JEFFERSON CNT’Y’S CMTY. CORR. PROGRAM, THE BURDEN
OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE DEBT IN ALABAMA: 2014 PARTICIPANT SELF-REPORT SURVEY 11-12 (2014),
https://finesandfeesjusticecenter.org/articles/the-burden-of-criminal-justice-debt-in-alabama/
[https://perma.cc/8BRF-PTFR] (finding that 17 percent of survey respondents had committed
offenses such as drug sales, sex work, or property offenses in order to obtain money to pay
economic sanctions). See generally BETH A. COLGAN, BROOKINGS INST., ADDRESSING MODERN
DEBTOR’S PRISONS WITH GRADUATED ECONOMIC SANCTIONS THAT DEPEND ON ABILITY TO PAY
9-11 (2019) (discussing additional studies related to the deterrent effect of economic sanctions).
133. For a discussion of how excessive economic sanctions offend retributive goals, see
Colgan, supra note 27, at 47-61 & n.257.
134. See COLGAN, supra note 132, at 9 (collecting studies documenting how innocent people
pay for economic sanction debt, with that burden falling particularly heavy on Black women);
see also Thomas B. Harvey & Janae Staicer, Policing in St. Louis: “I Feel Like a Runaway
Slave Sometimes,” in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF POLICING IN THE UNITED STATES 53
(Tamara Rice Lave & Eric J. Miller eds., 2019) (quoting Samantha Jenkins, who had been
incarcerated due to inability to pay traffic tickets until her family managed to make payment:
“It put my momma and sister in a bind.”).
135. Cf. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 429 (1979) (declining to require a beyond a
reasonable doubt standard for civil commitment proceedings in part because psychiatric
diagnoses are sufficiently uncertain that requiring such a standard would make it impossible
for the government to succeed in committing people with serious mental health needs).
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In addition to its overall interest in responding to illegal behavior,
government officials have also expressed a specific utilitarian
interest in pursuing forfeitures.136 There are two primary justifications for forfeitures. First, property may serve as an “instrumentality” of an offense—essentially a tool used by the person to commit
a crime, such as a car driven to the location of a drug buy.137 Second,
cash may be forfeited if it constitutes crime proceeds; so, too, may
property purchased in whole or in part with crime proceeds.138
Proponents of the use of forfeiture posit that seizing property instrumental to committing a crime will deter offenses by making
them harder to commit, and that seizing crime proceeds will deter
offenses by making them less lucrative.139 Again, the actual deterrent value of forfeiture practices is questionable overall140 and
made more so by the use of civil forfeiture processes. In all but the
small handful of jurisdictions that have disallowed civil forfeiture,141
these processes allow the government to forfeit cash or property
without obtaining a conviction—or even charging the owner—with
a criminal offense.142 And while California and Florida require law
enforcement to prove a nexus exists between the seized items and
criminal activity beyond a reasonable doubt in at least some circumstances,143 other states require only clear and convincing evidence,144 a preponderance of the evidence,145 or even mere probable
cause,146 before shifting the burden to the property owner to prove
their innocence. As a result, there is less certainty in the civil
136. See David J. Fried, Rationalizing Criminal Forfeiture, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLGY,
328, 368-69, 386 n.269 (1988) (discussing the potential deterrent effect of forfeiture).
137. See, e.g., Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 686 (2019).
138. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 982(a), 1963(a); 21 U.S.C. §§ 853(a), 881(a).
139. See United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 351-52 (1998) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
140. See, e.g., John Burnett, Sheriff Under Scrutiny Over Drug Money Spending, NPR
(June 18, 2008), https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=91638378 [https://
perma.cc/G65Q-2U9Z] (quoting a drug task force officer who described cash forfeitures as
“chump change” for drug cartels).
141. See Nick Sibilla, Maine Becomes Fourth State to End Civil Forfeiture, INST. FOR JUST.
(July 13, 2021), https://ij.org/press-release/maine-becomes-fourth-state-to-end-civil-forfeiture/
[https://perma.cc/7QGY-YPYX].
142. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 983.
143. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 11488.4(h)(2)(i)(1)-(2) (West 2017); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 932.704(8) (2016).
144. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4311(M) (2017); id. § 4312(H)(5)(a).
145. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 34-24-1-4(a) (2019).
146. See MASS. GEN. LAWS Ch. 94C, § 47(d) (2018).
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forfeiture context (as well as other settings in which guilt is determined at less than a beyond a reasonable doubt standard) that
deterrable criminal activity has even occurred. Further, because in
many jurisdictions forfeiture statutes are written so broadly, the
nexus between the cash or property and an alleged offense can be
tenuous—for example, the forfeiture of an elderly couple’s home
after their adult son allegedly sold twenty dollars worth of marijuana from their front porch.147 But assuming for these purposes
that forfeitures deter unlawful activity in at least some cases, if
procedures for ascertaining disproportionality are too strict, those
efforts at deterrence will be undermined.
The government’s interest in responding to crime also includes
the awarding of restitution to crime victims for the stated purpose
of making victims financially whole.148 Yet, even this interest is
more complicated than it first appears. Victims’ need for financial
assistance following a crime can be great, particularly in light of the
fact that crime victims disproportionately come from low-income
communities of color, and so are unlikely to have access to savings
or community resources that may aid in their recovery.149 That need,
however, is not fulfilled by the imposition of restitution awards upon
a person who has no meaningful ability to pay.150 Hundreds of
billions of dollars in restitution arrears exist nationwide—awards
that the government often acknowledges are unlikely ever to be
paid.151 Additionally, many crime victims report that responses that
147. Pa. Senate Judiciary Committee (Oct. 20, 2015) (testimony of Louis S. Rulli, Practice
Professor of Law and Director of Clinical Programs, University of Pennsylvania Law School)
at 3.
148. See Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 670-71 (1983) (treating restitution as an
important interest but rejecting the argument that revocation of probation for nonpayment
of restitution satisfies that interest when imposed upon those who have no meaningful ability
to pay).
149. See ALL. FOR SAFETY & JUST., CRIME SURVIVORS SPEAK: THE FIRST-EVER NATIONAL
SURVEY OF VICTIMS’ VIEWS ON SAFETY AND JUSTICE 4 (2016), https://allianceforsafetyand
justice.org/crimesurvivorsspeak/ [https://perma.cc/7GLH-GX9C]; ERIKA HARRELL, LYNN
LANGTON, MARCUS BERZOFSKY, LANCE COUZENS & HOPE SMILEY-MCDONALD, BUREAU OF JUST.
STAT., WCJ248384 HOUSEHOLD POVERTY AND NONFATAL VIOLENT VICTIMIZATION 2008-2012
2 (2014), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/hpnvv0812.pdf [https://perma.cc/LVV6-988P].
150. Cf. Bearden, 461 U.S. at 670 (“Revoking the probation of someone who through no
fault of his own is unable to make restitution will not make restitution suddenly forthcoming.”).
151. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-203, FEDERAL CRIMINAL
RESTITUTION: MOST DEBT IS OUTSTANDING AND OVERSIGHT OF COLLECTIONS COULD BE
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improve community safety are central to their recovery.152 The imposition of unmanageable restitution may conflict with that need,
as there is increasing evidence to suggest that such awards are
criminogenic.153
Perhaps surprisingly, restitution is not so divorced from the risk
that lawmakers will abuse the government’s prosecutorial power to
generate revenue as it may seem. To be sure, restitution for nongovernmental victims does not increase governmental resources.
But given the frequency by which restitution goes unpaid, if lawmakers took making crime victims financially whole more seriously,
they would have to find ways to directly fund relief to a wider array
of victims, which would almost certainly require increased taxation.154 That appears unlikely. A recent study of the political
economies in play as the federal government took up whether to
increase crime victim compensation revealed that lawmakers refused to do so if it would require an increase in government expenditures, only agreeing to support financial relief for victims
when the proposal shifted to one in which compensation took on the
form of restitution made payable by the person convicted of the
offense.155 Similarly, though lawmakers in all fifty states have
adopted systems for providing additional victim compensation, they
have both populated those funds with revenues from other types of
economic sanctions and narrowly defined eligibility for compensation in large part to ward off a need to supplement the funds with
tax revenue.156
An additional governmental interest relevant to the assignment
of burdens in the excessive fines context is its interest in limiting
unnecessary administrative costs related to hearings to determine

IMPROVED 25-26 (2018), https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/689830.pdf [https://perma.cc/9R6679QR].
152. See SERED, supra note 116, at 29-30.
153. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
154. See Shirin Sinnar & Beth A. Colgan, Revisiting Hate Crimes Enhancements in the
Shadow of Mass Incarceration, 95 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 149, 157-62 (2020).
155. See Jeremy R. Levine & Kelly L. Russell, Crime Pays the Victim: Criminal Fines, the
State, and Victim Compensation Law, 1964-1984 3-4 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
the author).
156. See Sinnar & Colgan, supra note 154, at 155-60; Levine & Russell, supra note 155, at
3-4.
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financial effect and overall excessiveness.157 It is reasonable to
expect that an assignment that protects people from the imposition
of economic sanctions will result in an increase in the number of
hearings, particularly where the government’s use of economic
sanctions is aggressive—for example, high-dollar-value fines, the
imposition of numerous fees, or the forfeiture of cash or property
only tenuously related to an offense.158 It is also reasonable to expect
an uptick in challenges when the government seeks to impose
economic sanctions against people with limited capacity to pay them
or absorb their loss.159
But no matter the administrative costs, the government has no
valid interest in the strategic advantage a favorable assignment of
burdens would provide if it interferes with the full realization of the
Constitution’s protections160 including those afforded to its citizens
through the Eighth Amendment.161 That includes protection against
lawmakers succumbing to the temptation to pursue excessive economic sanctions that outpace the government’s penal interests in
order to line governmental coffers at the expense of the politically

157. Cf. Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 367 (1996) (considering “the State’s interest in
the efficient operation of its criminal justice system”).
158. See, e.g., infra note 216 (regarding high fines related to drug offenses); Pimentel v.
City of Los Angeles, 974 F.3d 917, 922-25 (9th Cir. 2020) (holding that a sixty-three dollar
base fine for a parking violation is not constitutionally excessive but remanding on the question of whether a series of late payment fees are); Transcript of Oral Argument at 43-45,
Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682 (2019) (No. 17-1091) (positing, by counsel for Indiana, that
the state could forfeit an automobile for the violation of a minor traffic offense); supra note
147 and accompanying text (regarding the limited nexus in certain cases).
159. See infra Part II.B.1.
160. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 79 (1985) (“The State’s interest in prevailing at
trial ... is necessarily tempered by its interest in the fair and accurate adjudication of criminal
cases” and therefore, “a State may not legitimately assert an interest in maintenance of a
strategic advantage over the defense, if the result of that advantage is to cast a pall on the
accuracy of the verdict obtained.”).
161. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 381 (1910).
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vulnerable.162 The government’s interests are satisfied, then, by an
assignment of burdens that “exhibits a difference between unrestrained power and that which is exercised under the spirit of
constitutional limitations formed to establish justice.”163
Finally, the government has an interest in operating in a way
that protects its legitimacy by instilling confidence in the citizenry
that it is acting to secure community safety and well-being. The use
of economic sanctions disproportionate to the underlying offense
undercuts this interest in a variety of ways. When lawmakers value
revenue generation over public safety, law enforcement practices
can shift away from the protection of the community. One recent
study, for example, has shown that governmental dependence on
revenues from economic sanctions pushes law enforcement toward
the enforcement of offenses that result in their imposition and away
from solving violent and serious property crime.164 Further, people
in heavily policed communities targeted for revenue-focused policing
become afraid of police involvement, learning not to call 911 out of
fear that they will become the subject of enforcement. For example,
when Samantha Jenkins called the police to her home to help her
during a domestic violence incident, the officers ran a warrants
check on her, found a warrant related to unpaid traffic tickets, and
arrested her on the spot.165 The same department later declined to
arrest the perpetrator of a homicide in her neighborhood despite the
existence of multiple cooperative witnesses.166 Isiah Kinloch called
police to his apartment after a man broke in and assaulted him.167
162. See Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 689 (2019) (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501
U.S. 957, 979, n.9 (1991) (plurality) (opinion of Scalia, J.) (“For good reason, the protection
against excessive fines has been a constant shield throughout Anglo-American history ...
[e]ven absent a political motive, fines may be employed ‘in a measure out of accord with the
penal goals of retribution and deterrence,’ for ‘fines are a source of revenue.’”)).
163. Weems, 217 U.S. at 381.
164. Rebecca Goldstein, Michael W. Sances & Hye Young You, Exploitative Revenues, Law
Enforcement, and the Quality of Government Service, 56 URB. AFFS. REV. 5, 8, 17, 21-22 (2020)
(finding that a 1 percent increase in the portion of municipal budgets funded through
economic sanctions “is associated with a statistically and substantively significant 6.1
percentage point decrease in the violent crime clearance rate and 8.3 percentage point
decrease in the property crime clearance rate”).
165. Harvey & Staicer, supra note 134, at 44-45.
166. Id.
167. Anna Lee, Nathaniel Cary & Mike Ellis, TAKEN: How Police Departments Make
Millions by Seizing Property, GREENVILLE NEWS (Apr. 22, 2020, 7:34 PM), https://www.
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While he was at the hospital being treated for a head wound, the
officers searched his apartment, taking $1,800 in cash he had
earned as a tattoo artist, claiming that it must have been crime
proceeds.168 For those of limited means subject to cycles of enforcement, sanctioning, and penalties for nonpayment, detailed next, the
message received is that system actors—lawmakers, judges, and law
enforcement—prize revenue and social control over public safety
and justice.169 In other words, it is in the government’s interest to
get this right. Its legitimacy may be protected by an assignment of
burdens that makes successful excessive fines challenges more
likely.
2. Private Interests
There are also significant private interests at stake. In any case
in which an erroneous imposition of excessive economic sanctions
occurs, a person upon whom sanctions are imposed is deprived of
money or property without justification. But the risk is particularly
fraught for those with limited means to pay excessive fines, fees,
and restitution, or to absorb the loss wrought by an excessive forfeiture—which is relevant both to questions of financial effect and
disproportionality.170
With respect to unmanageable fines, fees, and restitution, the
deprivation of cash when payments are made can interfere with the
ability of people and their families to meet basic human needs,
including access to food, stable housing, childcare, and necessary
medical care.171 This is true even when people manage to pay in full
immediately because the money used to pay off economic sanctions
is siphoned away from those basic needs.172 When immediate
greenvilleonline.com/in-depth/news/taken/2019/01/27/civil-forfeiture-south-carolina-policeproperty-seizures-taken-exclusive-investigation/2457838002/ [https://perma.cc/4BBS-JHEG].
168. Id.
169. See Colgan, supra note 27, at 58-61.
170. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
171. ALA. APPLESEED CTR. FOR L. & JUST., UNDER PRESSURE: HOW FINES AND FEES HURT
PEOPLE, UNDERMINE PUBLIC SAFETY, AND DRIVE ALABAMA’S RACIAL WEALTH DIVIDE 4 (2018),
https://www.alabamaappleseed.org/underpressure/ [https://perma.cc/KLV8-7HY8] (click “Read
the Full Report”).
172. See, e.g., id. (finding that 82.9 percent of survey respondents reported having to skip
payments on basic necessities or child support in order to pay economic sanctions); Steven
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payment in full is impossible, the ongoing debt can result in even
greater financial precarity, forcing people to subjugate their basic
needs and those of their families throughout the period of debt.173
The financial consequences are so great that the Federal Reserve is
now including the financial impact of economic sanctions in its
Survey of Household Economics and Decisionmaking.174
The financial precarity caused by debt from unpaid economic
sanctions is exacerbated when lawmakers employ highly punitive
responses to nonpayment.175 In some cases, these practices restrict
access to employment, education, childcare, medical care, and the
like by literally preventing the person from getting there. These
practices include driver’s license revocations, vehicle impoundment
programs, and the use of arrest warrants.176 For example, a study
of driver’s license revocation in New Jersey found that 42 percent of
those surveyed lost existing employment due to license suspension,
nearly half of whom were unable to find new employment; of those
Mello, Speed Trap or Poverty Trap? Fines, Fees, and Financial Wellbeing, FINES & FEES JUST.
CTR. 1, 35-36 (Nov. 14, 2018), https://mello.github.io/files/jmp.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q3PLWXB9].
173. Colgan, supra note 27, at 58-60; Harvey & Stacier, supra note 134, at 49 (quoting
Meredith Walker) (“When it comes time to pay tickets and court fines, they supersede all
other things. Whatever medical bills you have, whatever. If the electric bill is due and that
court money is due, you gotta pay the court money and let your lights get cut off because
lights being cutoff, you’re still at your house. Court not being paid, you have a warrant.”); see
infra notes 176, 178-79 and accompanying text (regarding warrant practices).
174. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS., REPORT ON THE ECONOMIC WELL-BEING OF
U.S. HOUSEHOLDS IN 2019, FEATURING SUPPLEMENTAL DATA FROM APRIL 2020 1, 9-10 (May
2020), https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/2019-report-economic-well-being-ushouseholds-202005.pdf [https://perma.cc/6PNS-MYXG].
175. These consequences of nonpayment are distinct from the array of “collateral consequences” lawmakers have created that are imposed upon conviction of certain offenses. See
infra notes 272-74 and accompanying text.
176. See, e.g., William E. Crozier & Brandon L. Garrett, Driven to Failure: An Empirical
Analysis of Driver’s License Suspension in North Carolina, 69 DUKE L.J. 1585, 1594-1602
(2020); Roediger, supra note 116, at 224 (regarding the persistent use of warrants in Missouri
municipal courts even after the Department of Justice investigation into Ferguson’s court
practices, including at rates that exceed an average of more than one warrant per household);
Elliott Ramos, Chicago Police Impound 250,000 Vehicles Since 2010. Here’s Why City Hall’s
Rethinking That, WBEZ CHICAGO (July 13, 2020), https://www.wbez.org/stories/chicago-policeimpounded-250000-vehicles-since-2010-heres-why-city-halls-rethinking-that/a085f94b-4a87437b-837a-d5b4501a9168 [https://perma.cc/8HCL-4BD3]. The Idaho Supreme Court has ruled
that the use of arrest warrants in response to nonpayment is unconstitutional. Beck v. Elmore
Cnty. Magistrate Ct., 489 P.3d 820 (Idaho 2021) (striking down the practice under the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments).
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who did, 88 percent had to take jobs with reduced pay.177 Vehicle
impoundment quite literally results in the deprivation of a means
of transportation. And an arrest on a warrant for nonpayment not
only raises the immediate risk caused by the incarceration itself—
which may include dangerous and unsanitary conditions178—but
also, by cutting the person off from the outside world, it interrupts
one’s ability to meet their own and their families’ basic needs.179
In addition to governmental responses to nonpayment that directly restrict the ability to meet basic needs, other practices create
further hurdles. For example, employers and landlords increasingly
rely on credit reports when considering candidates, and so the
destruction of credit that can result from ongoing debt impedes access.180 Barriers to access are even higher in jurisdictions in which
full payment is required in order to seal or expunge arrest and conviction records.181 And the use of wage garnishment as a collection
method adds administrative obligations potential employers may
be reluctant to take on.182
When people saddled with unmanageable economic sanctions lose
access to basic human needs, they do not bear those harms alone;
those conditions are shared by their families. Unmanageable economic sanctions may result in family disunification, both upon

177. ALAN M. VOORHEES TRANSP. CTR, & N.J. MOTOR VEHICLE COMM’N, MOTOR VEHICLES
AFFORDABILITY AND FAIRNESS TASK FORCE: FINAL REPORT 38 (2006).
178. See, e.g., Harvey & Stacier, supra note 134, at 51-55 (describing conditions in jails in
St. Louis County, Missouri, as overcrowded, lacking necessary medical care, exposing people
to blood and feces smeared in cells, failing to provide clean and sufficient food and water and
basic hygiene items such as toothbrushes and menstrual supplies, and allowing sexual
harassment by corrections staff).
179. See, e.g., id. at 55 (interviewing Keilee Fant, who law enforcement arrested multiple
times on warrants for nonpayment, resulting in the loss of several jobs that may have allowed
her to move off of public assistance).
180. See, e.g., KATHERINE A. BECKETT, ALEXES M. HARRIS & HEATHER EVANS, WASH. STATE
MINORITY & JUST. COMM’N, THE ASSESSMENT AND CONSEQUENCES OF LEGAL FINANCIAL
OBLIGATIONS IN WASHINGTON STATE 43-44, 48 (Aug. 2008), https://finesandfeesjusticecenter.
org/articles/the-assessment-and-consequences-of-legal-financial-obligations-in-washingtonstate/ [https://perma.cc/2F8S-VT57].
181. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 610.140.5(3) (precluding eligibility for expungement unless
all fines and restitution are paid); see also Amy Kimpel, Paying for a Clean Record, 112 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY (forthcoming 2022) (on file with author).
182. Katherine Beckett & Alexes Harris, On Cash and Conviction: Monetary Sanctions as
Misguided Policy, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 509, 518 (2011).
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arrest for nonpayment183 and when family members are forced to
separate in order to find piecemeal housing when rent becomes
infeasible.184 These periods of separation can be deeply traumatic,
particularly to children who are unable to understand why it has
occurred.185 Nicole Bolden, who had been arrested for nonpayment
of traffic tickets, explained:
When I got arrested, I was away from him for two and a half
weeks. He was one. He goes through withdrawals now. He
freaks out every time I get ready to leave. He always asks me
where I am going, am I coming back, no matter where I go. I
could just be going down to the grocery store, “Are you coming
back?”186

An inability to complete payment may also, in some jurisdictions,
result in the extension or substitution of other forms of punishment.
That can include interest and collection costs that outpace the original debt, making it difficult and at times impossible for people to
reach the principal amount.187 It can also include prolonged terms
of probation and parole due to ongoing debt, keeping people who
cannot afford to pay in full under the thumb of the government for
longer periods of time than those who can.188 Some jurisdictions
provide people with the option of accepting a jail term as a means

183. See, e.g., Harvey & Stacier, supra note 134, at 46-47; cf. Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct.
2056, 2073 (2016) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (regarding the frequency by which arrest warrants
are issued in relation to outstanding debt on low-level traffic and ordinance violations);
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975) (explaining that confinement after arrest “may
imperil the suspect’s job, interrupt his source of income, and impair his family relationships”).
184. See Colgan, supra note 27, at 66-67.
185. Harvey & Stacier, supra note 134, at 46-47 (interviewing mothers arrested for nonpayment regarding their children’s confusion about their absence and fear that it will
reoccur).
186. Id. at 47.
187. See, e.g., LAWS.’ COMM. FOR CIV. RTS., NOT JUST A FERGUSON PROBLEM: HOW TRAFFIC
COURTS DRIVE INEQUALITY IN CALIFORNIA 1, 15-19 (Apr. 13, 2015), https://lccrsf.org/wpcontent/uploads/Not-Just-a-Ferguson-Problem-How-Traffic-Courts-Drive-Inequality-inCalifornia-4.8.15.pdf [https://perma.cc/5K99-78MA]; Colgan, supra note 69, at 288-89.
188. See ALA. APPLESEED CTR. FOR L. & JUST., supra note 171, at 4, 20; Beth A. Colgan,
Wealth-Based Penal Disenfranchisement, 72 VAND. L. REV. 55, 77-80 (2019); Nathan Wong
Link, Paid Your Debt to Society?: Legal Financial Obligations and Their Effects on Former
Prisoners 144-47 (Aug. 2017) (Ph.D. dissertation, Temple University) (on file with Temple
University) [https://perma.cc/3WXC-XJMB].
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of “working off” the debt; the fact that people take up that offer
despite the often dangerous conditions inside American jails shows
just how illusory such a choice is and how overwhelming the debt
can be.189 Some jurisdictions will allow a substitution of labor
through community service for debt; that work is often outside the
scope of labor protections, can create childcare issues, takes up time
a person may otherwise use for paid employment, and displaces paid
labor in the community.190 And in many jurisdictions, where people
are disenfranchised from the right to vote due to a conviction, the
inability to pay economic sanctions can preclude reenfranchisement,
denying people the opportunity for full civic participation.191
These collections and enforcement practices can exacerbate the
degree of stigma associated with an offense, increasing the risk to
people who are unable to complete payment.192 When considering
the fairness of an assignment of burdens, the Supreme Court has
drawn a distinction between civil processes resulting in a loss of
money or property and those that would result in more serious
deprivations, such as the termination of parental rights.193 In doing
so, it has placed proceedings that would stigmatize a person or
family on the side of the equation demanding more protective
standards of proof.194 While initially low-level violations may carry
189. NIETO, supra note 119, at 2; see supra notes 178-79 and accompanying text. Additional
research is needed to determine how often people opt-in to a jail term as a means of debt relief
because many jurisdictions do not track those figures. In response to one survey conducted
by the California Research Bureau, two counties reported that in fiscal year 2004-05, over a
thousand people chose jail over debt. NIETO, supra note 119, at 26.
190. See LUCERO HERRERA, TIA KOONSE, MELANIE SONSTENG-PERSON & NOAH ZATZ, UCLA
LAB. CTR., WORK, PAY, OR GO TO JAIL: COURT-ORDERED COMMUNITY SERVICE IN LOS ANGELES
3-4 (Oct. 2019), https://www.labor.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/UCLA_Community
ServiceReport_Final_1016.pdf [https://perma.cc/2KT9-FFSW].
191. See Colgan, supra note 188, at 58-60. For a survey of state laws on the relationship
between unpaid economic sanctions and disenfranchisement as of July 2020, see generally
MARGARET LOVE & DAVID SCHLUSSEL, WHO MUST PAY TO REGAIN THE VOTE? A 50-STATE
SURVEY, COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES RESOURCE CENTER (July 2020).
192. See CALANDRA DAVIS, HOPE POL’Y INST., EXAMINING THE INTERSECTION BETWEEN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND FINANCIAL SERVICES IN THE DEEP SOUTH 3-5, 9-10 (Jan. 13, 2021),
http://hopepolicy.org/manage/wp-content/uploads/Criminal-Justice-Paper.pdf [https://perma.
cc/J52T-DHEU].
193. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747-48 (1982).
194. Id. at 756-59 (noting that proceedings that threaten a “stigma” require greater protection); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 424 (1979) (explaining that civil cases involving
a loss of money or property do not create a risk “of having his reputation tarnished erroneously”).
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little, if any, stigma, a low-level offense may become stigmatizing by
a jurisdiction’s collections and enforcement practices. For example,
the use of arrest warrants can result in public humiliation and the
indignity of jail booking procedures,195 subjecting a person to a
greater degree of stigma for even those offenses that are not inherently stigmatizing in and of themselves.196 Further, regardless
of offense level, the stigma associated with an offense may be extended when the inability to pay economic sanctions precludes
completion of probation or parole or prevents access to the expungement or sealing of records of arrest and conviction.197
The use of forfeitures also carries significant risks for those who
are unable to absorb the shock of losing cash or property. Because
forfeitures are intended to deprive people of the instrumentalities
of an offense and crime proceeds, cash or property becomes eligible
for forfeiture due to its relationship to the offense; in most cases, its
dollar value is irrelevant to its forfeitability.198 But that value is
highly relevant to those against whom excessive forfeitures would
be imposed. For example, the loss of a forfeited automobile may
mean that the person or his or her family may no longer have the
means to access employment and educational services; to reach
grocery stores, childcare, medical treatment, and the like; or to
satisfy other legal obligations, including attending probation and
parole meetings required as a separate component of punishment.199
Similarly, the forfeiture of a family’s home causes displacement and
195. Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2070 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (explaining
that upon arrest, jailers may “swab DNA from the inside of your mouth, and force you to
‘shower with a delousing agent’ while you ‘lift [your] tongue, hold out [your] arms, turn
around, and lift [your] genitals.’” (alterations in original) (quoting Florence v. Bd. of Chosen
Freeholders of Cnty. of Burlington, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1514 (2012)).
196. See Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 702 (1981) (noting that arrests carry with
them “the indignity associated with a compelled visit to the police station”); Harvey & Stacier,
supra note 134, at 43 (quoting Kristine Hendrix, a woman arrested after she was unable to
pay traffic ticket debt) (“There’s a lot of shame that goes into that as a person when you’re
being arrested. Being arrested is traumatic, especially when you’re arrested for something
that’s just so petty. Failure to pay a ticket, so petty.”).
197. See supra notes 181, 188 and accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text. A few jurisdictions have adopted rules
that alter or limit the procedures for forfeiture eligibility depending on the dollar value of the
forfeiture. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11488.4(i) (applying different standards
of proof for proving forfeitability depending on the dollar value of the seized cash or property).
199. See Colgan & McLean, supra note 32, at 437-39.
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may also result in family disunification.200 And a forfeiture can also
be both humiliating and stigmatizing, as it links the owner to sometimes serious criminal offenses even when no conviction results.201
These risks are not borne evenly across society. The difficulties
caused by the loss of income, cash, or property resulting from economic sanctions are exacerbated for people of color, people with
physical disabilities, people who have mental health issues or
chemical dependencies, and those who have been subjected to terms
of incarceration in light of preexisting structural barriers to
housing, employment, and more.202 Further, as detailed above, enforcement practices that result in the imposition of economic sanctions are often targeted at heavily policed communities of color.203
These sanctions strip money from such communities—either directly through money spent to pay fines and fees, or indirectly by
the taking of real and personal property that may or may not ever
be replaced.204 Those monies might otherwise have been spent in
support of local businesses, thus supporting taxes for services that
help communities flourish.205 Instead, economic sanction revenues
are often used to fund the perpetuation of criminal legal systems
that both over-police those communities and leave them in peril
when law enforcement efforts are focused on revenues rather than
public safety.206 But even when funds are used to support other public services, such as education, inequalities may be exacerbated.207
By redistributing the revenues generally, without consideration of
the community from which they were stripped, fines, fees, and forfeitures serve as hidden regressive taxes other communities do not

200. Rulli, supra note 147, at 3-4.
201. See, e.g., Angela J. Davis, Race, Cops, & Traffic Stops, U. MIA. L. REV. 425, 438-40
(1997) (describing the detention of a Black family during a pretextual traffic stop for hours
in the early morning hours, while law enforcement forced them to stay out on the road in the
rain while a drug dog searched their vehicle); Colgan, supra note 120 (regarding the use of
pretextual traffic stops as a method of accruing forfeiture revenues).
202. See COLGAN, supra note 132, at 8-9.
203. See supra notes 125-30 and accompanying text.
204. See, e.g., Colgan & McLean, supra note 32, at 449.
205. Cf. MICHAEL LEACHMAN, MICHAEL MITCHELL, NICHOLAS JOHNSON & ERICA WILLIAMS,
ADVANCING RACIAL EQUITY WITH STATE TAX POLICY 3 (Nov. 15, 2018) (explaining that removing barriers to success in communities of color benefits the economies of those communities).
206. See supra notes 164-69 and accompanying text.
207. See Colgan, supra note 123, at 1557-58.
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bear.208 For those communities, the ripple effects of excessive economic sanctions include downstream consequences of nonpayment,
perhaps most pointedly with respect to ongoing voter disenfranchisement.209 Studies show that disenfranchisement due to a criminal conviction disproportionately diminishes voting rights in Black
communities both directly and by depressing voter participation
beyond those formally disenfranchised.210 As a result, these communities lose out on opportunities for fiscal prosperity and the civic
participation that would render them less politically vulnerable.
In sum, people against whom excessive economic sanctions are
imposed—particularly those in heavily-policed communities of color—risk increased financial precarity that may interrupt their
ability to meet their own and their families’ basic needs. They may
be subjected to highly punitive responses to nonpayment such as
driver’s license suspensions, towing, and warrants for nonpayment
as well as additional economic sanctions and extensions of other
forms of punishment such as probation and parole. They are burdened with the stigma that these practices bring, even when the
underlying offense is as minor as a traffic ticket. These sanctions
also create risks to these communities by prioritizing the enforcement of minor offenses over public safety, by stripping funds needed
to support community resiliency, and by reducing the political power
of such communities through voter disenfranchisement. Each of
these risks is relevant to the assignment of burdens.
With both governmental and private interests in mind, we turn
next to an assessment of how the assignment of each of the four
burdens may reduce the risk of an erroneous determination.
B. Burden of Raising the Excessive Fines Claim
There is a common assumption that the party who would benefit
from a claim has the burden of raising it.211 Here the assumption
208. See id.
209. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
210. See, e.g., Melanie Bowers & Robert R. Preuhs, Collateral Consequences of a Collateral
Penalty: The Negative Effect of Felon Disenfranchisement Laws on the Political Participation
of Nonfelons, 90 SOC. SCI. Q. 722, 738, 740 (2009) (finding that disenfranchisement “policies
tend to dampen the probability of voting” in Black communities).
211. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
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would be that people against whom economic sanctions are imposed
have the burden of raising an excessive fines claim, full stop. But,
because in many circumstances the government has created systems
that make it unlikely that people will be aware of or have the capability of litigating excessive fines claims, the question is not so
straightforward. In addition to those contemporary considerations,
this Section provides limited historical evidence regarding this
burden before proposing a method of assigning burdens that accounts for the governmental and private interests noted above and
the procedural risks that make erroneous determinations likely in
many cases.
1. Contemporary Considerations
Considerations of fundamental fairness include an examination
of whether a burden exacerbates or alleviates the risk that the decisionmaker will reach an erroneous determination.212 Relevant
considerations include whether the person seeking enforcement of
a right is afforded counsel,213 and whether the procedure creates an
imbalance of power between the government and the party whose
right is in question.214
The risk of an erroneous determination of financial effect and
overall excessiveness is heightened in cases in which there is a lack
of access to counsel to assist in raising an excessive fines challenge,
which is common in a significant percentage of cases involving
economic sanctions.215 Economic sanctions are widely used in felony
cases216 where the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is afforded,217
212. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 428 (1979).
213. See Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 516 (1990) (upholding a
parental notification statute placing the burden of proof on minors seeking abortions to prove,
by clear and convincing evidence, that the minor is sufficiently mature or that the medical
procedure is in the minor’s best interest, in part because “the minor is assisted in the courtroom by an attorney as well as a guardian ad litem”).
214. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 763 (1982) (describing parental termination
proceedings: “The State’s ability to assemble its case almost inevitably dwarfs the parents’
ability to mount a defense.”); see also Akron Ctr., 497 U.S. at 504 (“[T]he bypass procedure
contemplates an ex parte proceeding at which no one opposes the minor’s testimony.”).
215. See Megan T. Stevenson & Sandra G. Mayson, The Scale of Misdemeanor Justice, 98
B.U. L. REV. 731, 735-36 (2018).
216. Drug offenses, for example, often carry high fines and fees and are a key target for
forfeiture practices. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 69.50.401(A)(2) (2019) (setting fines
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but the volume of misdemeanor, municipal, traffic, parking, and
civil forfeiture cases each year in the United States dwarfs the
felony caseload.218 The Court has limited the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel in non-felony cases to those in which a term of
incarceration is actually imposed.219 With few exceptions, lawmakers choose not to provide access to counsel where a constitutional
right does not attach.220 Legal services programs—which have insufficient funding to provide for the extensive needs of low-income
clients on other matters— rarely have capacity to take up these
“quasi-criminal” cases.221 Left on their own, it is highly unlikely that
people subjected to economic sanctions would be aware of the
Clause’s existence, let alone the mechanism for determining proportionality, the types of arguments related to the financial effect of
the sanctions on them or their families that may be in play, or how
to preserve or undertake an appeal of the excessiveness determination.222 Without the “guiding hand of counsel,”223 people are
effectively left outside of the Clause’s protective ambit.
between $2,000 and $100,000); id. §§ 69.50.430, .438 (adding additional fines between $1,000
and $500,000); id. § 69.50.505(I)(g) (regarding cash and property forfeitures related to drug
crimes).
217. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
218. See, e.g., Stevenson & Mayson, supra note 215, at 737 (estimating annual misdemeanor case filings at 13.2 million). Even with access to counsel in felony cases, there is often
a lack of attention to economic sanctions, likely due to power imbalances in plea bargaining
brought on by the threat of significant periods of incarceration. See Beth A. Colgan, Nor
Excessive Fines Imposed, in THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT AND ITS FUTURE IN A NEW AGE OF PUNISHMENT 173-74 (Meghan J. Ryan & William Berry III, eds., 2020); see also infra notes 335-36
and accompanying text.
219. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979) (holding that the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel does not apply to non-felony cases unless incarceration is ordered).
220. For example, the federal government provides counsel in civil forfeiture proceedings,
but only when the person is already represented by appointed counsel in a related criminal
case or if the property subject to forfeiture is the person’s primary residence. 18 U.S.C.
§ 983(b).
221. Rulli, supra note 147, at 2-3, 19. The University of Pennsylvania School of Law’s legal
clinic provides representation in civil forfeiture cases, but only has capacity to take on a
limited number of cases involving the forfeiture of homes. Id.
222. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932) (explaining that without counsel, a
layperson would be ignorant of the claims available and how to marshal evidence); cf. Jenny
Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: Defining Effective Advocacy in the Lower Criminal
Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277, 337 (2011) (“[I]ndividuals who plead guilty in the fastpaced, high-volume lower criminal courts may not even be aware of the right to appeal, or the
need to file a notice of appeal within a short time period after conviction.”).
223. Powell, 287 U.S. at 69.

2021]

THE BURDENS OF THE EXCESSIVE FINES CLAUSE

453

Additionally, the risk of an erroneous decision is heightened in
civil proceedings in which lawmakers have reduced the government’s burden of proof for establishing wrongdoing. Because excessiveness is measured by gross disproportionality, in which
offense seriousness is weighed against punishment severity, a reduction in certainty as to the very existence of the offense or the
person’s culpability for it necessarily increases the risk that the
economic sanctions imposed will be disproportionate.224 Yet, lawmakers have employed a reduced standard of proof in many lowlevel traffic and public order cases.225 Lawmakers have also often set
reduced standards of proof for establishing a nexus between
forfeited cash or property and alleged criminal activity.226 The risk
of error is particularly great when a lack of access to counsel and a
reduced burden for establishing guilt are combined. The lack of
counsel at the guilt stage means that the person “may be put on
trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent
evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible.”227 And with a lower standard of proof required, the certainty of
whether an offense occurred at all is further undermined. But in
any case, given the role that offense seriousness plays in the disproportionality evaluation, the risk of an erroneous determination
goes up as the certainty of guilt drops.
Finally, civil forfeiture proceedings are designed in a manner that
results in a significant imbalance of power between the government
224. See supra notes 22-33 and accompanying text.
225. See, e.g., ARIZ. R. PROC. CIV. TRAFFIC AND CIV. BOATING VIOLATION 17 (burden on the
state by a preponderance in traffic cases); WIS. STAT. § 800.08(3) (2013) (“The standard of
proof for conviction of any person charged with violation of any municipal ordinance shall be
evidence that is clear, is satisfactory, and convinces the judge to a reasonable certainty.”).
Some states have retained a beyond a reasonable doubt standard in low-level cases. See, e.g.,
FLA. STAT. § 318.14(6) (2020) (traffic cases). It is often unclear what standard is used in
processes that allow people to challenge parking violations, though the structure of such processes effectively places the burden of proof on the person ticketed. See, e.g., City of Chicago,
Contesting Tickets In-Person (Parking, Red Light and Automated Speed Enforcement), https://
www.chicago.gov/city/en/depts/fin/supp_info/revenue/challenging_tickets/contesting_in_per
son.html [https://perma.cc/GZR9-8UE5] (listing affirmative defenses for parking violations).
Whether reductions in the burdens of proof on the issue of guilt in these proceedings comports
with due process is outside of the scope of this Article but worthy of further examination in
its own right.
226. See supra notes 143-46 and accompanying text.
227. Powell, 287 U.S. at 68-69.
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and the person whose cash or property is forfeited and thereby may
effectively preclude excessive fines claims.228 Lawmakers have often
designed civil forfeiture proceedings to be so complex that experienced attorneys have difficulty parsing them.229 Given the complexity of the proceedings, the cost of representation often exceeds the
value of the cash or property to be forfeited, which disincentivizes
any challenge to the forfeiture, let alone an excessive fines challenge.230 Adding to the expense, in many jurisdictions lawmakers
have mandated that a person seeking to challenge a forfeiture pay
bonds that may be in the hundreds or thousands of dollars and
therefore initiating proceedings within which an excessive fines
challenge might be raised could be cost prohibitive.231 As Justice
Thomas recently explained, the resulting lack of oversight “has led
to egregious and well-chronicled abuses,” including that “forfeiture
operations frequently target the poor and other groups least able to
defend their interests in forfeiture proceedings.”232
2. Historical Evidence
We turn now to the consideration of the very limited and mixed
historical record with respect to the assignment of the burden of
raising an excessive fines claim. While records exist that provide
more insight as to the other burdens, in this case, it should be
afforded little weight in the overall analysis.
A key problem with the historical record on this point relates to
possible anachronisms between historical and modern practices. It
was widely accepted that at common law, for any misdemeanor offenses codified without setting a specific punishment and for felonies in which the person convicted had been given the benefit of
228. See Sarah Stillman, Taken, NEW YORKER (Aug. 5, 2013), https://www.newyorker.com/
magazine/2013/08/12/taken [https://perma.cc/E38S-WZQZ].
229. See id.
230. See id.; Michael Sallah, Robert O’Harrow Jr., Steven Rich, & Gabe Silverman, Stop
and Seize: Aggressive Police Take Hundreds of Millions of Dollars from Motorists Not Charged
with Crimes, WASH. POST (Sept. 6, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/
2014/09/06/stop-and-seize [https://perma.cc/UV93-K3YZ].
231. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 712A-10(9) (higher of $2,500 or 10 percent of the property
value).
232. Leonard v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 846, 848 (2017) (Thomas, J., statement respecting the
denial of certiorari).
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clergy, judges (and in some instances, juries) 233 had discretion to
impose sanctions constrained by Magna Carta and the Excessive
Fines Clause.234 Less clear are the bounds of and processes for
judicial discretion where codified misdemeanors explicitly set out
the punishment to be imposed, including the amount of the fine or

233. The ability of juries to set fines was codified in some early American statutes, subject
to the same constitutional restrictions as judges. See, e.g., 1786 VA. ACTS 41-42 (in an act for
“moderating amercements,” requiring fines to be set by a jury limited by the proportionality
and financial effect guarantees of Magna Carta); see also Kistler v. State, 54 Ind. 400, 404
(1876) (describing a statute giving juries the ability to set fines and other punishments, subject to the restrictions of the Eighth Amendment).
234. See BISHOP, supra note 84, § 940 (“[W]hen a statute forbids or commands an act of a
public nature, but is silent as to the punishment, the common law imposes, for disobedience,
fine and imprisonment.”); id. (noting that Connecticut courts have found that the fine must
be limited and that courts may not forfeit (all the defendant’s “property”)); id. § 941
(explaining that it was within judicial discretion to consider aggravating or mitigating facts
in determining whether to “make the punishment heavier or lighter”); 4 BLACKSTONE, supra
note 84, at 371-73 (explaining that, consistent with Magna Carta and the English Bill of
Rights, judges had no authority to disregard the form of punishment established through
statute, but that “pecuniary fines neither can, nor ought to be, ascertained by any invariable
law” because “[t]he value of money itself changes from a thousand causes; and, at all events,
what is ruin to one man’s fortune, may be matter of indifference to another’s”); CHITTY, supra
note 90, at 710 (“It may be laid down as a general rule, that all those offences which exist at
common law, and have not been regulated by any particular statute, are within the discretion
of the court to punish.”); id. at 711-17 (explaining that after the ceremonial branding of the
person’s hand to mark that the person had used their one opportunity for benefit of clergy,
punishments were left “to the wisdom of the court” subject to the restrictions of Magna Carta,
the English Bill of Rights, and the principles of proportionality); THOMAS COOLEY, A TREATISE
ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE
STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 328 (Boston, Little, Brown and Co. 1868) (“Within such
bounds as may be prescribed by law, the question of what fine shall be imposed is one
addressed to the discretion of the court. But it is a discretion to be judicially exercised, and
it would be error in law to inflict a punishment clearly excessive.”); W. EDEN, PRINCIPLES OF
PENAL LAW 73 (3d ed. 1744-1776) (“It is the usage of the courts, superinduced on the clause
of Magna Charta relative to civil amercements, never to extend the fine of any criminal so far,
as to take from him the implements, and means of his profession, and livelihood; or to deprive
his family of their necessary support.”); see also Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 480
n.7 (2000) (noting that English trial judges in the late eighteenth century had limited sentencing discretion in felony cases beyond invoking the pardon process, but significantly more
discretion in misdemeanor cases in which fines were imposed); Jones v. United States, 526
U.S. 227, 244 (1999) (noting the “breadth of judicial discretion over fines and corporal punishment in less important, misdemeanor cases”); Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246
(1949) (“[B]oth before and since the American colonies became a nation, courts in this country
and in England practiced a policy under which a sentencing judge could exercise a wide discretion in the sources and types of evidence used to assist him in determining the kind and
extent of punishment to be imposed within limits fixed by law.”).
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forfeiture.235 Some sources suggest that judges were constrained to
impose the statutory fine,236 shifting the procedure for obtaining
relief to a pardon, a direction to the prosecutor to enter a nolle prosequi,237 or through administrative procedures overseen by other
entities, such as the Secretary of the Treasury.238 In contrast, other
sources suggest that even where a statute set a specific penalty, judges were mandated to avoid imposing that penalty should it be
constitutionally excessive in light of the degree of the person’s culpability for the offense and financial condition,239 or even to remit
fines once imposed.240 While the position that judges have authority

235. For examples of the codification of explicit punishments for misdemeanors, see
CHITTY, supra note 90, at 706-07.
236. See id. at 707-08 (describing a punishment set out in statute and noting that
“therefore, the courts will regard themselves as bound to pronounce a judgment, embracing
all the punishments which those acts severally inflict”); id. at 809-10 (“[W]here a statute
specifies the sum to be forfeited, the court have (sic) no power to mitigate it after conviction.”).
237. BISHOP, supra note 84, § 708 (describing availability of pardon power to remit fines
and forfeitures, though noting limitations on the pardoning of costs); CHITTY, supra note 90,
at 706-07, 763-64 (describing the availability of pardon or nolle prosequi at the Crown’s
direction).
238. CHITTY, supra note 90, at 722, 810 (regarding requests for admission to be submitted
to the court of Exchequer or the lords of Treasury); see also infra notes 277-93 and accompanying text.
239. See, e.g., Louisville, H. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Commonwealth, 46 S.W. 207, 208 (Ky. 1898)
(noting that the jury set the fine within the statutory range and “[h]ence we should not disturb the judgment,” but also stating that “cases might arise in which this court would feel
bound, under [the state’s Excessive Fines Clause], to refuse its sanction to laws which imposed excessive fines”); S. Express Co. v. Commonwealth ex rel. Walker, 22 S.E. 809, 811 (Va.
1895) (rejecting the contention that the lack of a maximum fine renders a statute facially excessive because “if a jury were to impose such a fine, it is the province of the court, and would
be its duty, to set aside the verdict”); see also People v. Haug, 37 N.W. 21, 27-28 (Mich. 1888)
(relying on Magna Carta’s prohibition on “impair[ing] the capacity of gaining a business livelihood” in partially striking down a statute that, in addition to fines and possible imprisonment, punished pharmacists who failed to keep required records of liquor sales with a
prohibition on engaging in the pharmacy business for two years).
240. See, e.g., ARTHUR P. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW IN COLONIAL VIRGINIA 116 n.222 (1930)
(“There are examples, mostly in the seventeenth century, of county courts having remitted
fines which they had imposed.”).
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to determine that an economic sanction set out in statute is
constitutionally excessive has won out,241 these procedural anachronisms provide only a shaky historical foundation for the assignment of burdens.
In addition to those anachronisms, the record is mixed as to
procedures involving the question of whether a fine was or was not
appropriate. As now, a presumption historically existed that the
party requesting the court to act in a particular way would have the
obligation of raising the claim.242 But the idea of a moving party
with respect to the propriety of imposing economic sanctions does
not fit comfortably with historical sentencing processes, at least in
the bulk of cases in which judges had discretion as to the amount of
fine to impose.243 There is some support for placing the obligation on
the defendant wishing to reduce a fine: scattered references to those
upon whom fines are imposed moving for a reduction,244 and the
ability of judges to impose fines without the defendant being present
while requiring defendants to appear in court to present an
argument for mitigation.245 There is also some evidence to support
241. United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 324 (1998) (striking down a mandatory
forfeiture as excessive); 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1) (mandating that when a person is convicted of
a reporting offense, the court “shall order that the person forfeit to the United States any
property, real or personal, involved in such offense, or any property traceable to such property”). The Court’s willingness to strike down economic sanctions despite the mandatory
nature of the statute at issue may separate the Excessive Fines and Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clauses. Though writing only for a plurality of three, in Harmelin v. Michigan,
Justice Kennedy opined that individualized sentencing was not mandated outside of the death
penalty context, and that “[p]rosecutorial discretion before sentence and executive or legislative clemency afterwards provide means for the State to avert or correct unjust sentences.”
501 U.S. 957, 1007-08 (1991) (plurality) (opinion of Kennedy, J.).
242. WIGMORE, supra note 94, at 3526 (“The party having the risk of non-persuasion ... is
naturally the one upon whom first falls this duty of going forward with evidence; because,
since he wishes to have the jury act for him, and since without any legal evidence at all they
could properly take no action, there is no need for the opponent to adduce evidence.”).
243. See supra notes 233-41 and accompanying text; see also CHITTY, supra note 90, at 70708 (describing misdemeanors with fixed penalties and noting “the more usual course is to
proceed at common law, because prosecutions on the statute are attended with more difficulty,
and require more formal exactness”); id. at 711 (explaining that in addition to common law
misdemeanors and those codified without set sentences, the sentencing of clergiable felonies
also fell within the realm of judicial discretion).
244. See, e.g., THAYER, supra note 94, at 166 (describing a case from 1666 in which jurors
had been fined £5 each for returning an improper verdict, an amount reduced to forty shillings
“upon the petition of the jurors”).
245. BAKER, supra note 86, at 698; see CHITTY, supra note 90, at 809-10; see also People v.
Taylor, 3 Denio 91, 91 n.a (N.Y. 1846) (citing Chitty for the proposition that the court could
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placing the obligation on the prosecutor; in particular, there are references to placing the obligation to address a fine’s propriety on the
prosecutor who initiated the sentencing proceeding.246 Most likely
the truth is somewhere in the middle. It appears that the standard
procedure at sentencing was to allow the defendant to address the
court in mitigation and the prosecution in aggravation,247 with neither operating in the modern sense of a moving party.
There is also competing evidence regarding the obligation to raise
a claim in cases in which judges were understood to have limited
discretion given statutory mandates, which pushed the question of
a sanction’s propriety to pardons or similar processes. On the one
hand, pleading requirements that required pardon requests to specifically set out the grounds for relief indicate that the person requesting the pardon had an obligation to raise arguments related to
excessiveness,248 and other references in the historical record suggest that the person or his or her family were typically obligated to
seek relief.249 Further, at least during the reign of Henry VII, it
appears that the Crown regularly took bribes from people seeking
pardons, a troubling but useful indication that it was the person
seeking relief who initiated the process.250 On the other hand,
impose a sentence on a defendant who was not present in court if the sentence involved only
a fine).
246. CHITTY, supra note 90, at 181 (describing the prosecution as moving for aggravation).
It appears that in cases involving convictions of parishes for failing to keep highways in
working order, a different process was employed. It began with “the prosecutor, calling on the
defendants to show cause why a specific fine should not be imposed on them,” upon which the
defendants could “enlarge the rule, calling upon the trustees of the roads to show cause why
it should not be apportioned between themselves and the parishioners.” Id. at 690-91.
247. See State v. Reeder, 60 S.E. 434, 435 (S.C. 1908) (“The American cases lay down the
principle that, where it devolves upon the court to determine the punishment either upon the
finding or upon the plea of guilty, it is the correct practice for it to hear evidence in aggravation or mitigation, as the case may be, where there is any discretion as to the punishment.”); Kistler v. State, 54 Ind. 400, 408 (1876) (explaining that at common law, practices
allowed judges to consider aggravating and mitigating information in determining sentence
“when brought to its attention by the evidence”); ARCHBOLD, supra note 84, at 180-1 & n.4
(“[T]he defendant may address the court in mitigation of punishment, as well as in arrest of
judgment.”); BISHOP, supra note 84, § 633 (“When, therefore, the court is to pronounce its
sentence, if the law leaves to it a discretion, it will look at any evidence produced that should
properly influence a judicious magistrate to make the punishment heavier or lighter.”).
248. See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 84, at 390-95 (describing pardon processes).
249. See, e.g., CHITTY, supra note 90, at 722 (noting that the defendant “may obtain a
remedy by petition to the lords commissioners of the Treasury.”).
250. See BURN, supra note 74, at 32-33.
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judges—rather than the person who would be benefited by the
pardon—were allowed, and perhaps mandated, to begin the pardon
process in at least some cases,251 and in some periods this appears
to have been the primary method.252 Yet other records suggest that
other officials, such as local councils, could seek pardon on behalf of
a person within their community.253
In short, given both the anachronisms and the mixed record, the
assignment of burdens should be grounded on contemporary indicators of fundamental fairness rather than considerations of historical practice.
3. Assignment
In undertaking an assignment of the burden of raising an
excessive fines claim, consideration must be given to the governmental interests at stake, the corresponding private interests, and
the risk that the assignment will result in an erroneous imposition
of excessive fines.254 The government has an interest in responding
to illegal behavior, removing from circulation the instrumentalities
and proceeds of crimes, providing financial support for crime
victims, and avoiding unnecessary administrative costs.255 But it
also has an interest in the enforcement of the Excessive Fines
Clause and in preserving its own legitimacy through fair and just
proceedings.256 By establishing procedures that increase the risk
that a person will be unaware of and incapable of raising excessive
fines challenges, the government both undermines its own interests
and creates significant risk that erroneous determinations of financial effect and excessiveness will lead to the interruption of basic
needs, punishments for nonpayment, stigmatization, loss of civic
251. See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 84, at 394 (explaining that for parliamentary pardons
“a man is not bound to plead it, but the court must ex officio take notice of it”); Apprendi v.
New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 480 (2000) (noting that judges could begin the pardon process in
cases where the mandated sentence was inappropriate).
252. See BAKER, supra note 86, at 590 (noting that judicial initiation of pardons was routine
by 1700); J.M. BEATTIE, CRIME AND THE COURTS IN ENGLAND: 1600-1800 431-32 (1986) (describing the procedure by which courts initiated pardon proceedings).
253. See SCOTT, supra note 240, at 202.
254. See supra notes 34, 106 and accompanying text.
255. See supra Part II.A.1.
256. See supra notes 160-69 and accompanying text.
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participation, and the undermining of community well-being that
has plagued many of those subjected to economic sanctions.257
The following proposed assignments recognize gradations in risk
in various types of proceedings. In cases in which a right to counsel
attaches and in which lawmakers have refrained from imposing
other procedural barriers to raising a claim, the obligation to raise
a claim could be assigned to the party against whom economic
sanctions would otherwise be imposed. In contrast, at least in cases
involving fines, fees, restitution, or criminal forfeitures for which
lawmakers have declined to provide counsel, that assignment would
only be appropriate if the government provides meaningful notice
of the availability of, and issues important to, excessive fines
claims.258 Though the risk of governmental abuse is reduced in cases
in which restitution is paid to non-governmental victims, this notice
requirement should apply in the restitution context as well. The
government has an interest in the imposition of restitution awards,
but excessive restitution awards are more likely to be unmanageable and remain unpaid and may even undermine the desire many
victims have to live in safe and stable communities.259 Unmanageable restitution also can result in long-term financial instability for
those upon whom restitution is imposed and their families.260
Providing notice of potential claims while requiring people seeking
the protection of the Clause to ultimately raise those claims strikes
a proper balance. Regardless of the type of economic sanction at
257. See supra Part II.A.2.
258. For notice to be meaningful, it must be designed to account for the pressures inherent
to being called into court and lack of familiarity with legal systems and terminology so that
the legal issues at hand are accessible. See generally D. James Greiner, Dalié Jiménez & Lois
R. Lupica, Self-Help Reimagined, 92 IND. L.J. 1119, 1123-24 (2017). Self-help tools related to
ascertaining the financial effect of economic sanctions are becoming more common. See, e.g.,
Superior Court of California, County of San Francisco, Can’t Afford to Pay, https://www.
sfsuperiorcourt.org/divisions/traffic/cant-afford-pay [https://perma.cc/2GKZ-X97D]. For a discussion on the administrative and economic efficiencies that may be created by gathering
information related to financial effect, see Beth A. Colgan, Graduating Economic Sanctions
According to Ability to Pay, 103 IOWA L. REV. 53, 69 (2017). For a discussion of the potential
negative consequences of ability-to-pay determinations that are too invasive and do not attend
to structural bias, see Theresa Zhen, (Color)Blind Reform: How Ability-to-Pay Determinations
Are Inadequate to Transform a Racialized System of Penal Debt, 43 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 175, 209 (2019).
259. See supra notes 148-56 and accompanying text.
260. See supra Part II.A.2.
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issue, to be meaningful, notice must include not only the existence
of the claim, but also the nature of the gross disproportionality test
and importance of financial effect to it, how to provide relevant
evidence, and how to appeal if the initial claim is unsuccessful.261
In addition to the requirement to provide meaningful notice in
situations in which lawmakers fail to afford counsel, in civil settings
in which lawmakers have chosen to reduce the government’s burden
of proving wrongdoing below a beyond a reasonable doubt standard
the nature of the notice should be extended. For notice to be
meaningful, it would be necessary to ensure that the explanation of
the gross disproportionality tests include the importance of noting
the uncertainty on the offense-seriousness side of the scale, the
relevance of which is discussed below.262
Finally, in circumstances in which lawmakers have developed
systems that make it highly unlikely that an excessive fines challenge would be made—such as civil forfeiture proceedings in many
jurisdictions—the government should carry the burden of initiating
the excessiveness inquiry. That assignment attends to the combination of a lack of counsel, reduced standards of proof, fiscal barriers
that make retention of counsel unlikely, and other procedures that
raise the risk of governmental abuse,263 as well as the risk of financial precarity caused by the loss of forfeited cash and property.
C. Burden of Production
When attending to the production of relevant evidence, the
Supreme Court has looked to both who has “superior access” to the
evidence and how burdens may be used to incentivize the parties to
provide such evidence.264 As detailed below, these considerations,
261. Cf. North v. Russell, 427 U.S. 328, 335 (1976) (upholding the use of lay judges in
courts handling low-level offenses on the assumption that courts provide notice of the unconditional right to a trial de novo—essentially a form of appeal—and the time by which such
an appeal must be filed).
262. See infra notes 300-08 and accompanying text.
263. See supra notes 228-32 and accompanying text.
264. Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 455 (1992) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“In
determining whether the placement of the burden of proof is fundamentally unfair, relevant
considerations include: whether the government has superior access to evidence; [and]
whether the defendant is capable of aiding in the garnering and evaluation of evidence on the
matter to be proved.”); see also Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 355 & n.6 (1996) (striking
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along with helpful information in the historical record, support an
imposition of burdens of production designed to meet those aims.
1. Contemporary Considerations
Given that a key consideration within the excessiveness inquiry
is the financial effect of economic sanctions on the person upon
whom they are imposed, it would appear that the defendant would
have the greatest access to relevant information, including evidence
about their finances, dependents, and other debts.265 If that were the
extent of information relevant to financial effect, it may make sense
to place the burden of production on this issue entirely on the
defendant.
But in reality, the government has superior access to much of the
information necessary to make such a determination. For example,
for people who are also sentenced to a term of incarceration, the
government has access to data regarding the likelihood of obtaining
employment within the jail or prison and what the limited wages for
that employment would be.266 The government also has access to its
formulas for deducting economic sanctions arrears from such wages
and from any monies sent to the incarcerated debtor by family and
friends that would otherwise be available for the purchase of
hygiene items, food, educational services, and the like.267 It is also
down the use of a clear and convincing evidence standard in proceedings to determine
competency to stand trial and noting that burdens may be used to incentivize a party to
“cooperate with the information-gathering process necessary to a reliable competency
determination”) (citing Medina, 505 U.S. at 455 (O’Connor, J., concurring)); Santosky v.
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 763 (1982) (regarding parental rights termination hearings in which
the state “enjoys full access to all public records concerning the family,” and that the relevant
witnesses would be state child protective service employees); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513,
523-24 (1958) (explaining that considerations of fairness include which party has
“opportunities for knowledge” regarding the issue at hand) (quoting Morrison v. California,
291 U.S. 82, 88-89 (1934)); Com. Molasses Corp. v. N.Y. Tank Barge Corp., 314 U.S. 104, 111
(1941) (“Since the bailee in general is in a better position than the bailor to know the cause
of the loss and to show that it was one not involving the bailee’s liability, the law lays on him
the duty to come forward with the information available to him.”).
265. Cf. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 3 (1951) (noting “petitioners submitted statements as
to their financial resources, family relationships, health, prior criminal records, and other
information” in requesting a reduction of bail).
266. See, e.g., CAL. CODE REGS., tit. 15, § 3040(j) (2021).
267. Mary Fainsod Katzenstein & Maureen R. Waller, Taxing the Poor: Incarceration,
Poverty Governance, and the Seizure of Family Resources, 13 PERSPS. ON POL. 638, 642 (2015).
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the government that contracts with phone providers, often at exorbitant rates, and sets policies related to expenses for other
services, such as medical co-pays—and so it holds relevant information about the fiscal burdens of incarceration.268 Similarly, if a
person is to be sentenced to a period of probation and parole, government actors often have authority to impose or waive supervision
fees, or other expenses including those for drug testing or mandatory treatment services, making evidence regarding the likely scope
of those fees uniquely within the government’s control.269 And in any
case, because the government controls the collection of economic
sanctions, it is the government that has access to whether or not it
will impose collection costs, partial payment fees, and interest on
unpaid debt,270 as well as whether it will engage in tax-intercepts,
wage garnishment, or other collection methods.271
The government also has a unique ability to understand and
provide evidence related to the vast web of collateral consequences
of conviction it has devised that may impede a person’s ability to
pay debt from economic sanctions. Distinct from the downstream
consequences of nonpayment described above, such as driver’s license suspensions and vehicle impoundment,272 lawmakers have
also formulated collateral consequences unrelated to payment and

268. Id. at 643.
269. See, e.g., Minn. Dep’t. of Corr., Supervision Fees—Field Services 201.013(D) (Dec. 20,
2016) (“The commissioner of corrections may waive payment of the fee if the commissioner
determines that the offender does not have the ability to pay the fee, the prospects for
payment are poor, or there are extenuating circumstances justifying waiver of the fee.”).
270. See supra note 187 and accompanying text. There are strong arguments that these
various types of fees are themselves “fines” within the scope of the Clause’s protections.
Colgan, supra note 120, at 36; Colgan, supra note 27, at 316-17. See generally Lauren-Brooke
Eisen, Paying for Your Time: How Charging Inmates Fees Behind Bars May Violate the Excessive Fines Clause, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (July 31, 2014), https://www.brennancenter.org/
our-work/research-reports/paying-your-time-how-charging-inmates-fees-behind-bars-mayviolate [https://perma.cc/Z6X7-SNC3]; City of Seattle v. Long, 493 P.3d 94, 109-10 (Aug. 12,
2021) (holding that towing and impound fees constitute fines).
271. See, e.g., COLO. OFF. OF THE STATE AUDITOR, VICTIM’S RESTITUTION: THE JUDICIAL
BRANCH & DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS PERFORMANCE AUDIT 8-9, 23-25 (2014), https://
leg.colorado.gov/sites/default/files/documents/audits/2197p-victimsrestitutionapril2014.pdf
[https://perma.cc/C42U-E37G]; supra note 182 and accompanying text.
272. See supra notes 175-77 and accompanying text. Again, these practices may themselves
constitute fines for purposes of the Clause. Long, 493 P.3d at 109 (holding that vehicle impoundment is a fine).
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which are imposed upon conviction.273 These consequences are so
many and so diverse that even an incomplete inventory includes
nearly 45,000 such consequences nationwide, including, for example, restrictions on occupational licensing and access to public
benefits that provide for basic human needs such as housing or food
assistance.274 All of these practices—over which the government has
superior access—may have implications for the person’s ability to
pay economic sanctions and absorb the loss of forfeited cash or
property.
2. Historical Evidence
As with the burden to raise the claim, historical evidence related
to the burden of production is also limited, though it provides greater insight that should be accorded some weight in the overall analysis. As detailed further below, the record supports the conclusion
that the assignment of the burden of production should account for
which party has unique access to relevant evidence.
The record shows that historically, both parties were afforded opportunities to provide evidence in support of their positions on the
appropriateness of economic sanctions.275 If the prosecution wished
to convince the judge as to the proportionality of a higher sentence
or the defendant wished to provide evidence lessening his or her
culpability or establishing a meager financial condition, the parties
were required to supply affidavits or other evidence to those ends.276
But there are also sources that indicate that the government had
an obligation to produce evidence that would tend to show an economic sanction’s disproportionality. Records of forfeiture remissions
from the early Treasury Department is one such source, and Kevin
Arlyck’s exploration of such remissions undertaken between 1789

273. See National Inventory of Collateral Consequences of Conviction, NAT’L REENTRY RES.
CTR., https://niccc.nationalreentryresourcecenter.org/ [https://perma.cc/T93A-QKYH].
274. Id.
275. See State v. Smith, 2 S.C.L. (2 Bay) 62, 62-63 (S.C. Ct. App. 1796).
276. See supra notes 242-47 and accompanying text; see also Smith, 2 S.C.L. (2 Bay) at 6263 (requiring evidence of extenuating circumstances to be submitted by affidavit to the court
for consideration after conviction and before sentencing); CHITTY, supra note 90, at 691-93
(describing the exchange of affidavits by the defense and prosecution prior to the sentencing
hearing).
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and 1806 proves particularly useful.277 In 1789, Congress passed a
series of customs laws establishing duties to be paid as well as a
broad array of reporting and processing requirements to be undertaken by people bringing ships into U.S. ports.278 Not only did
these statutes criminalize a wide range of behaviors, they also imposed strict liability for violations, rendering even inadvertent or
mistaken acts subject to punishment.279 The penalties for such violations included the imposition of heavy fines as well as the forfeiture of a ship’s contents, or even the vessels themselves.280 And,
like modern fines and forfeitures, these practices served to generate
revenue for the U.S. fisc, and also further incentivized customs investigations by allowing customs officers and informants to retain
a portion of the forfeiture proceeds.281
These early customs practices soon became the subject of concern and reform. By January 1790, Treasury Secretary Alexander
Hamilton reported to Congress that he had observed situations “in
which considerable forfeitures have been incurred, manifestly
through inadvertence and want of information.”282 Because the
breadth of the laws and the lack of a mens rea requirement gave the
government the ability to routinely impose fines and forfeitures
from which to generate revenue, Secretary Hamilton believed that
possibly unjust forfeitures could not “fail to attend the recent
promulgation of laws of such a nature.”283 He urged Congress to
create a system to provide relief so that “heavy and ruinous forfeitures” could be unwound.284 Later that year, Congress obliged,
passing the 1790 Remission Act, which allowed property owners to
petition the Secretary of the Treasury for a return of all or a part of
the forfeited items.285 The Act required petitioners to “truly and
particularly set[ ] forth the circumstances of his case.”286 After
277. Kevin Arlyck, The Founders’ Forfeiture, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 1449, 1452 (2019).
278. Id. at 1466-68.
279. Id. at 1468.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 1468-69.
282. Alexander Hamilton, Report on the Petition of Christopher Saddler, in 6 THE PAPERS
OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 191-92 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1962).
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 12, § 1, 1 Stat. 122, 122-23 (repealed 1797).
286. Id.
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hearing from the U.S. Attorney and any other person claiming a
portion of the fine or forfeiture, the judge provided a statement of
facts to the Secretary of the Treasury, who then had the discretion
to remit the punishments in whole or in part if he determined that
the penalty was “incurred without wilful negligence or any intention
of fraud.”287
To be sure, the historical record does not evince a direct tie
between the Remission Act and the Excessive Fines Clause, but as
Professor Arlyck recounts, there is reason to believe that Secretary
Hamilton and his contemporaries may have seen the two as related.288 In 1792, in arguing against the idea that fines and forfeitures imposed for violation of a separate federal law were “unusual
or excessive,” Secretary Hamilton pointed to the fact that they could
only be imposed for willful and fraudulent breaches.289 That stood
in contrast to the offenses for which relief from forfeiture was
granted in the Remission Act cases, suggesting his attentiveness to
the idea of proportionality between offense seriousness and
punishment severity.290 Though Professor Arlyck acknowledges this
provides a “slender reed,” Secretary Hamilton’s use of language
reflecting the Eighth Amendment’s prohibitions, along with the
familiarity amongst Americans writ large of the inherent nature of
the right against excessive fines,291 suggests at a minimum that
these procedures were understood to be guided by the principles
long-before secured by Magna Carta.
The 1790 Remission Act significantly cabined the government’s
customs practices in a way directly relevant to the assignment of
the burden of production. Although the burden of requesting remission was on the claimant who would present evidence to the trial
court, which the court would then summarize in a statement of facts
for Treasury’s review, Professor Arlyck’s study reveals that the

287. Id.
288. See Arlyck, supra note 277, at 1512-13; see also Colgan, supra note 69, at 323-24
(noting a need for caution when interpreting historical records that show a remission of
economic sanctions without an explicit connection to a constitutional source).
289. Arlyck, supra note 277, at 1512-13.
290. Id. at 1512-14 (describing debates related to the “Whiskey Tax” imposed for violations
of the Spirits Act).
291. See Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 692-93 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring in the
judgment); Arlyck, supra note 277, at 1513.
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Secretaries often sought out additional evidence from the customs
officers who made the seizure.292 As Secretary Hamilton put it to one
customs collector, he was “unwilling ... to precipitate a forfeiture as
long as there is a chance of new light to evince innocence.”293 This
suggests that while the initial burdens of raising the claim and
producing evidence rested with the property owner, government
officials felt an obligation not only to produce any relevant information in their control, but also to help claimants make the strongest
case possible in favor of remission.
In addition to these remission practices, historical treatises also
exhibit attention to access to relevant evidence. Early treatises note
that in the guilt phase of the trial, in circumstances in which the
party with the ultimate burden of persuasion would have to prove
a negative to succeed—for example, that a person is not insane to
ward off an insanity defense—a general principle arose that the
burden of persuasion on that point of fact should shift to the party
with “peculiar knowledge” on the question.294 Though the discussion
of the peculiar knowledge principle in the historical record relates
to determinations of guilt rather than sentencing and speaks in
terms of burdens of persuasion, this supports the modern Court’s
use of the burden of production to promote the delivery of relevant
evidence by the party with superior access.295
3. Assignment
Both contemporary considerations of fairness and evidence of
historical practice show that, for the assignment of the burden of
production, the primary concern is access to relevant evidence that
can be used to bolster the governmental goals of appropriately and
constitutionally responding to illegal behavior, that protect against
excessive sanctions that can undermine the fiscal health of the
people upon whom they are imposed, their families, and their
communities, and that help reduce the risk of an erroneous determination. The importance of access is relevant across both the
292.
293.
294.
295.

Arlyck, supra note 277, at 1490-91.
Id. at 1491.
See THAYER, supra note 94, at 359; WIGMORE, supra note 94, at 3524-25, § 2486.
See supra Part II.B.1.
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criminal and civil arenas, and so variation based on gradations of
procedural risk is unnecessary. Instead, no matter the forum, if one
party has peculiar knowledge of or superior access to evidence, the
burden of production should be placed accordingly.
As detailed above, in the excessive fines context, some of the
relevant information regarding financial effect and overall disproportionality will be peculiarly within the possession of the person
claiming an economic sanction is excessive, whereas the government
will have superior access to other relevant information.296 Therefore,
both parties should have the burden of production for information
to which they have peculiar knowledge and access.
In addition to considerations of access, burdens may also properly
be assigned in a manner that promotes parties to comply with their
production obligations.297 To promote production on both sides, once
the person challenging the sanctions provides a colorable claim that
their imposition will undermine the ability to meet basic human
needs or would interrupt activities that support that end, if the
government fails to provide evidence necessary to understand the
downstream consequences of ongoing debt and of conviction for the
offense, the standard of persuasion or related procedural rules—
discussed further in the next Section—should shift to become more
protective. The opportunity to be afforded more protective treatment
may incentivize the defense to produce mitigating evidence, and the
opportunity to avoid that heightened protection should incentivize
the government to produce evidence uniquely within its control.
D. Burden and Standard of Persuasion
The burden of persuasion—whether it be as to financial effect or
disproportionality—is an assignment of risk to a party, whereas the
standard of persuasion establishes the degree by which the party
with that burden must persuade the finder of fact.298 While separate
296. Cf. Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 456 (1992) (explaining that the government has
no “responsibility to gather evidence of a defendant’s competence” given that the relevant
evidence is within the control of the accused); Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 209 (1977)
(“To recognize at all a mitigating circumstance does not require the State to prove its nonexistence in each case in which the fact is put in issue.”).
297. See Medina, 505 U.S. at 455.
298. See, e.g., THAYER, supra note 94, at 356; Solum, supra note 107, at 691-92.

2021]

THE BURDENS OF THE EXCESSIVE FINES CLAUSE

469

concepts, there is an overlap in both contemporary considerations
and historical evidence regarding the risk of an erroneous determination, and so this Section addresses them together. Joined with the
governmental and private interests, these considerations support
the conclusion that the burden of persuasion should reside with the
government in all cases as to the financial effect of the sanction and
in all cases other than restitution for the determination of overall
excessiveness. These combined considerations also support variance
in the standards of persuasion according to the criminal or civil
nature of the proceeding and between economic sanctions whose
revenues accrue directly to the government and restitution paid to
non-governmental victims.
1. Contemporary Considerations
When assessing the constitutionality of the assignment of burdens and standards of persuasion the Supreme Court has looked to
three key considerations that are particularly relevant here: the
imprecision of the question to be determined, the risk that racial or
cultural bias will influence the decision, and the dearth of opportunities to seek the correction of an erroneous determination.
First, when assigning standards of proof, the Court has recognized that the imprecision or fallibility of the evidence related to
an inquiry supports the imposition of a protective standard.299 By its
very design, the ultimate question of disproportionality is inexact.
Recall that the disproportionality analysis weighs offense seriousness against punishment severity.300 With respect to offense seriousness, as the Court has explained, “any judicial determination
regarding the gravity of a particular criminal offense will be inherently imprecise.”301 The imprecision in determining offense seriousness is particularly strong in the civil context given the reduction in
the standard of proof for showing that the offense itself occurred.302
To date, the Court has only applied the disproportionality analysis
299. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 429 (1979) (requiring that the prosecution show
a need for civil commitment by clear and convincing evidence in part due to the “lack of
certainty and the fallibility” of the evidence).
300. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
301. United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 336 (1998).
302. See supra notes 143-46 and accompanying text.
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in criminal cases,303 in which the government is held to the burden
of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.304 That highest burden
is employed in criminal cases to “safeguard men from dubious and
unjust convictions, with resulting forfeitures of life, liberty, and
property.”305 Without it, criminal punishments—including economic
sanctions—cannot be imposed.306 The lower standard of proof in civil
settings effectively “dilute[s] ... the moral force” of the law, undermining the idea that “every individual going about his ordinary
affairs [can] have confidence that his government cannot adjudge
him guilty of a criminal offense without convincing a proper
factfinder of his guilt with utmost certainty.”307 By choosing to lower
the standard of proof as to wrongdoing, not only do lawmakers
create a greater risk of an erroneous determination of guilt, they
also increase the risk of an erroneous assessment of proportionality
by making it more likely that a person’s guilt will be overstated and
thus that they will be excessively punished.308
Similar to the question of offense seriousness, a determination of
financial effect for the purpose of assessing punishment severity is
necessarily imprecise and made more so by related governmental
policies. While it may be more readily quantifiable than, for example, a person’s competency,309 any deprivation that would result
in ongoing debt or loss of property that a person has little means to
replace requires a forward-looking calculation into an uncertain
future,310 made even more uncertain by the byzantine array of
303. See, e.g., Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 324; Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 997-98
(1991) (plurality) (opinion of Kennedy, J.).
304. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 358 (1970).
305. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 174 (1949).
306. See Nelson v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 1249, 1251 (2017) (requiring the return of monies
paid to satisfy economic sanctions after a successful appeal because “once those convictions
were erased, the presumption of innocence was restored”); McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477
U.S. 79, 92 n.8 (1986) (explaining that criminal penalties may only be imposed “[o]nce the
reasonable-doubt standard has been applied to obtain a valid conviction”).
307. In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 364.
308. See Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 355 (1996) (requiring defendant to prove
competency to stand trial by only a preponderance of the evidence rather than clear and
convincing evidence because the latter standard would create too great a risk that too many
people would be unable to prove incompetency).
309. See id.
310. For a discussion of how time limitations imposed on ongoing payments based upon
offense seriousness promote the principles undergirding the Excessive Fines Clause, see
Colgan, supra note 27, at 55-57.
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downstream penalties lawmakers have crafted when people prove
unable to pay311 and the collateral consequences of conviction.312
Though the requirement that the government provide information
in its control regarding the likely application of those penalties and
consequences would help reduce the imprecision of the determination,313 because debts for even minor offenses can go on for years,
the question of financial effect is necessarily speculative.314 And in
any case, judges may quite reasonably fail to anticipate economic
crises, such as that created by the COVID-19 pandemic, which has
been particularly calamitous for people of color and those who work
in low-wage, service sector employment,315 many of whom are also
subjected to disproportionate enforcement of pandemic-related
violations.316 When economic calamities come to be, those with the
most financial instability are the first to suffer losses and the last
to recover.317 What once may have been a manageable debt
may—due to personal, or in this case global, catastrophe—suddenly
be out of reach.
The imprecision inherent to the excessiveness inquiry can—yet
again—be further exacerbated by lawmaker decisions related to
system design. Along with the civil forfeiture processes described
above,318 another example of these design decisions can be found in
municipal courts. The most infamous municipal court is surely that
of Ferguson, Missouri, which municipal officials designed and
operated as a modern-day debtor’s prison that stripped revenue for
municipal use from its Black residents.319 But Ferguson is far from
311. See supra notes 175-91 and accompanying text.
312. See supra notes 272-74 and accompanying text.
313. See supra Part II.C.3.
314. See, e.g., Harvey & Staicer, supra note 134, at 50 (regarding a case in which it took
seven years to complete payment of debt related to traffic tickets).
315. See, e.g., Brea L. Perry, Brian Aronson & Bernice A. Pescosolido, Pandemic Precarity:
COVID-19 Is Exposing and Exacerbating Inequalities in the American Heartland, 118 PROCS.
NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. 1, 1 (2021).
316. See Timothy Colman, Pascal Emmer, Andrea Ritchie & Tiffany Wang, The Data Is In.
People of Color Are Punished More Harshly for Covid Violations in the US, GUARDIAN (Jan.
6, 2021, 6:17 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2021/jan/06/covid-violationspeople-of-color-punished-more-harshly [https://perma.cc/7QGM-UEJJ].
317. See id.
318. See supra notes 228-32 and accompanying text.
319. See generally Investigation of the Ferguson Police Department, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. CIV.
RTS. DIV. (Mar. 4, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attach
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alone. As Alexandra Natapoff and Justin Weinstein-Tull have
recently documented,320 in many jurisdictions these courts—which
handle local ordinance violations, traffic citations, and in some cases
misdemeanor offenses—operate in what some have called “constitution-free zones.”321 In many jurisdictions the judges in such
proceedings are not required to be lawyers or to have even basic
knowledge of the law.322 A survey of 1250 municipal courts in New
York found that nearly 75 percent of judges were not lawyers, “and
many—truck drivers, sewer workers or laborers—[had] scant grasp
of the most basic legal principles. Some never got through high
school, and at least one went no further than grade school.”323 But
even with law-trained judges, municipal courts are often subject to
limited oversight from state court systems324 and may experience
pressure to raise revenues to support court funding or other local
projects.325 Under such circumstances, there is a significant risk of
erroneous determinations of ability to pay and excessiveness that
can be tempered, at least somewhat, by placement of the burden
and standard of persuasion on the government at a high level.
ments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/9SNN-V85C].
320. See generally Alexandra Natapoff, Criminal Municipal Courts, 134 HARV. L. REV. 964
(2021); Justin Weinstein-Tull, The Structures of Local Courts, 106 VA. L. REV. 1031 (2020).
321. Weinstein-Tull, supra note 320, at 1046.
322. Natapoff, supra note 320, at 1000-03; Weinstein-Tull, supra note 320, at 1053-55.
323. William Glaberson, In Tiny Courts of N.Y., Abuses of Law and Power, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 25, 2006), https://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/25/nyregion/25courts.html [https://perma.
cc/HM9B-LXWX]; Weinstein-Tull, supra note 320, at 1054-55; see also Julia C. Lamber &
Mary Lee Luskin, City and Town Courts: Mapping Their Dimensions, 67 IND. L.J. 59, 67
(1991) (analyzing Indiana city and town courts and finding that only 42 percent of judges were
lawyers). The Supreme Court has approved the use of lay judges in courts handling low-level
matters such as traffic violations on the understanding that those cases did not involve “complex litigation.” North v. Russell, 427 U.S. 328, 334 (1976). For the reasons discussed herein,
an excessive fines claim is certainly more complex than determining whether or not someone
ran a red light. The Court also required that appeals as of right to a higher court be provided
in such cases, along with meaningful notice of how to undertake such an appeal. Id. at 335.
Further research is needed to understand the extent to which municipal courts using lay
judges adhere to those requirements. Cf. Natapoff, supra note 320, at 1003-05 (noting that
several states have limited appeals in ways inconsistent with Russell, including Delaware in
which appeals may not be taken for fines less than $100).
324. See Weinstein-Tull, supra note 320, at 1064-76.
325. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE CIV. RTS. DIV., supra note 319, at 14 (linking pressure
from Ferguson’s Finance Director and the municipal judge’s adoption of numerous fees and
surcharges, which the Finance Director praised in a report to the City Council as having helped “significantly increas[e] court collections over the years”).
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Second, in addition to considering the imprecision of the inquiry,
the Court has recognized the need for at least a clear and convincing standard when the assessment at hand is “vulnerable to
judgments based on cultural or class bias,” which it has explained
can be expected in circumstances where the people subject to the
possible deprivation are “poor, uneducated, or members of minority
groups.”326 As detailed above, law enforcement efforts at generating
revenue through economic sanctions have long been focused on
heavily policed—and particularly Black and Latinx—communities.327 Not only does that heighten the risk to people in those
communities when economic sanctions are imposed, it also heightens the risk that the determination of financial effect, and therefore
of overall excessiveness, will be faulty. Sentencing judges may, for
example, insufficiently account for structural issues of race and
class that restrict access to employment, childcare, health care, and
other basic needs.328
And finally, the risk of error is exacerbated by the fact that there
is a scarcity of opportunities to seek correction of an erroneous
determination. The Court has taken this concern particularly
seriously in cases in which the assignment of burdens involves a
decision that is irreversible: a determination as to insanity prior to
execution,329 a decision to remove life support,330 or the termination
of parental rights.331 But most recently, the same concern arose in
Nelson v. Colorado, in which the Court struck down a procedure
that both actually (in the case of misdemeanors) and effectively (by
assigning the burden of proof in felony cases to the individual
beyond a reasonable doubt) prevented a return of money paid to
satisfy economic sanctions imposed on the basis of convictions later
overturned.332

326. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 762-64 (1982) (requiring at least a clear and
convincing evidence standard be employed in hearings to terminate parental rights).
327. See supra notes 80-83, 125-30 and accompanying text.
328. See Zhen, supra note 258, at 201.
329. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 411-12 (1986).
330. Cruzan v. Director, 497 U.S. 261, 283 (1990).
331. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 759.
332. 137 S. Ct. 1249, 1260 (2017) (Alito, J., concurring) (“These stringent requirements all
but guarantee that most defendants whose convictions are reversed have no realistic opportunity to prove they are deserving of refunds.”).
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Opportunities to obtain relief on the issue of financial effect, as
well as the ultimate question of excessiveness are effectively
unavailable in many cases. The possibility of being sentenced to
terms of incarceration places tremendous pressure on people to
plead guilty to offenses carrying lower terms or no period of incarceration but that still involve, in many cases, significant economic sanctions.333 Once taken, the plea often carries with it a
waiver of the ability to appeal excessive fines claims.334 In addition,
because lawmakers have chosen not to provide counsel in many
misdemeanor and low-level cases, people are left to manage excessive fines claims on their own.335 As noted above, that is unlikely
given that laypeople may not be aware of the existence of the
Excessive Fines Clause, let alone how to argue and properly preserve an excessive fines claim.336 While the notice requirement proposed above with respect to the burden of raising the claim helps
temper this concern,337 even in misdemeanor cases, in which access
to counsel is afforded in at least some circumstances, appeals on any
issue—let alone excessive fines challenges—are rare. In a recent
study, Professors Nancy King and Michael Heise determined that,
accounting for all issues, appellate courts review only eight out of
ten thousand misdemeanor cases.338 Appeals are made even more
complicated in jurisdictions in which the lower courts that often
impose economic sanctions are not required to create transcripts
upon which an appeal may be based.339 Further, along with the
333. See, e.g., Christopher W. Maidona, Ordering Criminal Restitution: An Exercise in
Overstepping Statutory Authority, 120 W. VA. L. REV. 253, 272 (2017); Alexes Harris, Beth
Huebner, Karin Martin, Mary Pattillo, Becky Pettit, Sarah Shannon, Bryan Sykes & Chris
Uggen, United States Systems of Justice, Poverty and the Consequences of Non-Payment of
Monetary Sactions: Interviews from California, Georgia, Illinois, Minneosta, Missouri, Texas,
New York, and Washington, ARNOLD FOUND. 39 (2017), https://perma.cc/AVN9-3MTB (stating
that several respondents reported “that during their sentencing, they had been focused on so
many other things, such as the length of time they were going to be incarcerated, that they
didn’t fully comprehend the burden of the fines and fees being imposed until after they were
released and had to start making payments”).
334. See Alexandra W. Reimelt, An Unjust Bargain: Plea Bargains and Waiver of the Right
to Appeal, 51 B.C. L. REV. 871, 875-79 (2010).
335. See supra notes 218-21 and accompanying text.
336. See supra notes 222-23 and accompanying text.
337. See supra Part II.B.3.
338. Nancy J. King & Michael Heise, Misdemeanor Appeals, 99 B.U. L. REV. 1933, 1941
(2019).
339. Natapoff, supra note 320, at 980, 1003-04; Weinstein-Tull, supra note 320, at 1072-73.
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general limitations on error correction, in some forfeiture cases,
property may be sold off while an appeal is pending,340 and people
convicted of criminal offenses are precluded from requesting that
the U.S. Attorney’s office employ its statutory authority to mitigate
forfeitures.341
Beyond the limitations on relief via appeal, pardons may in theory provide an avenue for error correction, but that may also be
hampered by state policy. In some states, people are precluded from
seeking pardons until economic sanctions are paid in full.342 And,
though technically available in other states, pardons are employed
only rarely in modern times in any case.343 Further, while public
pressure has led some jurisdictions to offer one-time amnesty relief
for long-overdue debt,344 this ad hoc approach does not constitute
the kind of sustained and meaningful opportunity for relief that
might warrant a less-protective assignment of the burden and
standard of persuasion.345
2. Historical Evidence
As in the context of burdens of production, the historical evidence
relevant to the burdens and standards of persuasion to be assigned
in relation to excessive fines claims is useful for analyzing the fundamental fairness of these assignments. In particular, and despite
the longstanding pattern of abuse dating back to Magna Carta, the
historical record does show that protecting the guarantees of
proportionality and attention to one’s ability to meet basic needs
340. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963(f); 21 U.S.C. § 853(h).
341. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963(i)(2).
342. See, e.g., IDAHO ADMIN. CODE r. 50.01.01.550.02(b)(v) (2021).
343. See Rachel E. Barkow & Mark Osler, Reconstructing Clemency: The Cost of Ignoring
Clemency and a Plan for Renewal, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 6 (2015).
344. See, e.g., Nushrat Rahman, Detroit Court’s Amnesty Program Ends Next Week: What
You Should Know, DETROIT FREE PRESS (July 3, 2020, 4:49 PM), https://www.freep.com/story/
news/local/michigan/detroit/2020/07/02/detroit-36th-district-courts-amnesty-program/
3284371001/ [https://perma.cc/D9FV-9BXQ] (regarding a short-term program that allowed
waivers for fees but not fines related to traffic tickets).
345. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 428-29, 433 (1979) (mandating that the
standard for civil commitment be clear and convincing evidence, reasoning in part that it need
not be as high as a beyond a reasonable doubt standard because the person would be subject
to ongoing treatment and thus have repeated opportunities to seek release from an erroneous
commitment).
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was understood to be important, as is evident in caselaw,346
statutes,347 and treatises348 from the seventeenth century forward.
What is noteworthy in the historical record is evidence indicating
that, when taken seriously rather than ignored for fiscal and political gain, remission of fines and forfeitures was common, suggesting that the burden of persuasion was either on the claimant but at
a low standard or instead rested with the government to justify that
the punishment was not excessive. This is not to say that all attempts at seeking relief were successful; in the few as-applied
challenges in the early American appellate record, there were both
wins and losses.349 But other records suggest that at the trial stage
346. See, e.g., State v. Manuel, 20 N.C. 114, 128 (1838) (“Whether a fine be reasonable or
excessive ought to depend on the nature of the offense and the ability of the offender.”);
Commonwealth v. Morrison, 9 Ky. 75, 99 (Ct. App. 1819) (reasoning that a fine “should bear
a just proportion to the offense committed” as well as to “the situation, circumstances and
character of the offender”); Jones v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. 555, 556-57 (1799) (explaining that
fines must “be imposed secundum quantitatem delicit salvo contenemento” and, referring to
the Excessive Fines Clause, that “the fine or amercement ought to be according to the degree
of the fault and the estate of the defendant”); The Case of William Earl of Devonshire, 11
How. St. Tr. 1353, 1370 (H.L. 1689) (striking down a £30,000 fine as “excessive and exorbitant, against Magna Charta, the common right of the subject, and against the law of the
land”); see also State v. Reid, 11 S.E. 315, 316 (N.C. 1890) (“It is hardly possible, by any fixed
or arbitrary rule, to apportion, with exact precision, punishments to offenders; for there are
almost as many shades of guilt, and of aggravation or mitigation to be considered in passing
sentence, as there are offenses committed.”); Burgh v. State ex rel. McCormick, 9 N.E. 75, 55
(Ind. 1886) (noting that a court that uses discretion to impose severe fines in situations where
there is a “grave wrong” would be justified); State v. Miller, 94 N.C. 904, 907 (1886) (“[I]t may
not be so enormous and disproportionate to the crime proved by the evidence, indicating a
disposition to oppress, rather than subserve the common good.”); Blydenburgh v. Miles, 39
Conn. 484, 497 (1872) (noting that an individual challenge to the excessiveness of the fine
“must depend materially upon the circumstances and the nature of the act for which it is
imposed”); Bullock v. Goodall, 7 Va. 44, 48 (1801) (noting that the prohibition on excessive
fines be “commensurate to the offence and injury”).
347. See, e.g., 1787 N.Y. LAWS 344-45 (requiring that any “fine or amerciament shall always
be according to the quantity of his or her trespass or offence and saving to him or her, his or
her contenement”); 1786 VA. ACTS 41-42 (“[T]he amercement which ought to be according to
degree of the fault, and saving to the offender his contenement.”).
348. See, e.g., 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 84, at 371 (describing proportionality as requiring
consideration of “the aggravations ... of the offence,” and “the quality and condition of the
parties”); CHITTY, supra note 90, at 711 (explaining that judicial discretion is constrained by
Magna Carta); STEPHEN, supra note 84, at 490 (“The statutory rules as to the amount of the
fines ... are vague to the last degree. I know, indeed, of two [constraints] only. The first is the
provision of Magna Carta .... The second is the provision of the Bill of Rights.”).
349. Compare Bullock, 7 Va. at 49-50 (“No man can doubt, but that a fine of 264£ 8s. 9d.
imposed on an officer who has committed no fault, for the benefit of a creditor who has
sustained no injury, is superlatively excessive, unconstitutional, oppressive, and against
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and in other processes of remission, reductions in fines were relatively routine in at least some courts. For example, a tract contrasting the seventeenth century judicial practices of Archbishop of
Canterbury John Whitgift to other judges sitting in the Star
Chamber reported that he “did constantly in this Court maintain
the liberty of the Free Charter that none ought to be fined but salvo
contenimento. He seldom gave any sentence but therein did mitigate
in something the acrimony of those that spake before him.”350
Historical records related to pardon and similar procedures also
indicate that remission of economic sanctions was common. In the
mid- to late eighteenth century, the Rhode Island General Assembly
regularly granted petitions for relief, including on claims that economic sanctions would leave a person or his or her family destitute.351 Likewise, Professor Arlyk’s study of the 1790 Remission
Act proceedings provides an additional example of the common
practice of reducing economic sanctions that may otherwise be constitutionally excessive. As described above, after forfeiture, property
owners could seek relief through the Secretary of the Treasury, who
would often gather additional evidence regarding the circumstances
of the forfeiture.352 With evidence from both the property owner and
government collected, the Secretary would then consider whether to
grant relief.353 While the burden of proving that the violation was
unintentional was on the claimant, any plausible indication that the
offense was unwillful or due to ignorance of the law was sufficient
to require remission in whole or in part, even in cases with limited
or questionable evidentiary support.354 As a result, the Secretaries
granted 91 percent of all remission petitions, nearly three-quarters
conscience.”), with Ex parte Keeler, 23 S.E. 865, 868 (S.C. 1896) (holding that a fine imposed
for a dispensary act violation was not excessive).
350. BURN, supra note 74, at 4, 10; see also 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 84, at 19 (“[J]udges,
through compassion, will respite one half of the convicts, and recommend them to the royal
mercy.”); Alfred N. May, An Index of Thirteenth-Century Peasant Impoverishment? Manor
Court Fines, 26 ECON. HIS. REV. 389, 395-99 (1973) (analyzing court roles dating from 1208
to 1321 and positing, based in part on references to poverty in the records and the existence
of an economic crisis, that declining fine rates in the period may be explained by consistent
attention to individual financial condition in setting fines).
351. Colgan, supra note 69, at 331.
352. See supra notes 277-93 and accompanying text.
353. See supra notes 286-87 and accompanying text.
354. See Arlyck, supra note 277, at 1488-91.
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of which were granted in full, with the remaining grants significantly reducing the penalty.355
In addition to the frequency of remission, another historical practice—jury nullification—provides some insight regarding burdens
and standards of persuasion. Jury nullification occurred when jurors
refused to convict or convicted only for a lesser offense despite evidence of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt because they understood
that the punishment that would follow would be disproportionate to
the offense.356 As the Supreme Court has explained: “This power to
thwart Parliament and Crown took the form not only of flat-out
acquittals in the face of guilt but of what today we would call verdicts of guilty to lesser included offenses, manifestations of what
Blackstone described as ‘pious perjury’ on the jurors’ part.”357 In
some cases, jurors were motivated by a desire to avoid the imposition of forfeiture of estate, and so would convict only on lesser offenses that did not carry the penalty,358 or by declining to find the
existence of property that could be subject to forfeiture.359 To be
sure, available records do not explicitly tie this form of jury nullification to the Excessive Fines Clause. But because jurors were reacting in whole or in part to the severity of the punishment that
would be imposed upon conviction and its disproportionality to the
alleged offense, this practice effectively placed the burden of proving
proportionality on the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt.
355. Id. at 1488.
356. For example, in 1815 a South Carolina court remarked:
However absurd it may appear, that a jury who are sworn to determine a case
according to the evidence, should be authorized to find goods stolen of less value
than twelve pence, when all the witnesses swear they are of much greater value,
it is what Judge Blackstone calls a pious perjury, which they have been indulged
in, until it has become the law of the land. The principle has been too long
established, to be now called in question, and therefore, a new trial must be
refused.
JOSEPH BREVARD, REPORTS OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS IN THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 515
(1840) (reprinting State v. John Bennett); see also 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 84, at 18
(“[J]uries, through compassion, will sometimes forget their oaths, and either acquit the guilty
or mitigate the nature of the offence.”); Bushell’s Case, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006, 1017 (C.P. 1670)
(holding that jurors could not be fined for jury nullification absent a demonstration that the
result was actually improper).
357. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 479 n.5 (2000) (quoting Jones v. United States,
526 U.S. 227, 245 (1999)).
358. See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 84, at 380; GOEBEL & NAUGHTON, supra note 80, at 712.
359. See GOEBEL & NAUGHTON, supra note 80, at 715-16.
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3. Assignment
The following first addresses the assignments of the burdens and
then the standards of persuasion for various economic sanctions.
a. Burdens of Persuasion
When the contemporary considerations and historical practices
regarding governmental interests, private interests, and risks of
erroneous determinations are combined, they support an assignment of the burden of persuasion to the government for two questions: (1) financial effect regardless of economic sanction type; and
(2) the ultimate question of disproportionality with respect to fines,
fees, and forfeitures.
While the government has an interest in enforcing the law,
depriving people of the actual instrumentalities and proceeds of
crimes, and avoiding unnecessary administrative and economic
costs, those interests are set against the backdrop of a problematic
history. For centuries the allure of using the government’s prosecutorial power as a tax avoidance mechanism, implemented primarily
against those with limited political power, has proven too great to
go without a meaningful check.360 And the government has no
interest in the imposition of disproportionate economic sanctions
that undermine constitutional enforcement and raise questions
about its legitimacy.361
Further, the imposition of excessive fines can create significant
financial and social precarity for the person against whom they are
imposed and their families, with ripple effects felt by entire communities and particularly communities of color.362 Those risks are
present even with respect to restitution paid to non-governmental
victims, where the risk of governmental abuse is reduced. That
reduced risk is accounted for in assigning the burden of persuasion
for overall excessiveness of restitution to the defendant, addressed
next, and in assigning the standard of persuasion on that

360. See supra notes 67-87, 117-30 and accompanying text.
361. See supra notes 160-69 and accompanying text.
362. See supra Part II.A.2.
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question.363 The imposition of the obligation to pay $1,000 has the
same effect on a person’s financial condition—including the punitive
and stigmatizing responses to nonpayment devised by the government—no matter the recipient.
Add to this the imprecision inherent in determining disproportionality and financial effect, the risk of bias infecting such determinations, and the lack of opportunities to reverse a wrongful
imposition.364 Collectively, these considerations suggest that to meet
the requirement of fundamental fairness, the burden of persuasion
must be assigned to the government with regard to the financial
effect of any form of economic sanction, and with regard to proving
the proportionality of fines, fees, and forfeitures.
Unlike other economic sanctions, however, the assignment of
burdens and standards with respect to the disproportionality of a
restitution award to a non-governmental victim does not stand in
the shadow of such a significant risk of government abuse. It is true
that restitution is an imperfect system and that unmanageable
restitution can exacerbate financial precarity—which is considered
again below with respect to the standard of proof that should
apply.365 But it is also true that before restitution must be imposed,
the government carries the obligation to prove by at least a
preponderance of the evidence that there are compensable losses for
which the defendant is culpable, which provides at least a limited
degree of protection as to the offense seriousness side of the
proportionality inquiry.366 Therefore, it is in keeping with contemporary considerations of fairness and history to place the burden of
establishing the excessiveness of a restitution award on the person
against whom it is imposed.
b. Standards of Persuasion
With the burdens of persuasion assigned, the question becomes
what standard of proof should apply. Three traditional standards,
from most protective to least, are beyond a reasonable doubt, clear
363.
364.
365.
366.

See infra Part II.D.3.b.iv.
See supra Part II.D.1.
See infra Part II.D.3.b.iv.
See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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and convincing evidence, and the preponderance of the evidence.367
Generally, the Court has required the prosecution to prove sentencing factors, such as prior criminal history, by a preponderance of the
evidence, but has reserved the question of whether the burden
should be heightened for facts that may significantly increase sentence severity.368
i. Financial Effect
No matter the setting, when determining financial effect, a clear
and convincing evidence standard is warranted.369 There are, of
course, important distinctions between criminal and civil settings.
Those distinctions, however, are not implicated with respect to ascertaining the financial effect of the punishment. For example,
while it is true that in a criminal matter in which the sentence includes both fines and a period of incarceration, the fact of the incarceration—which, among other things, cuts the person off from
outside employment, substituting in the mere possibility of earning
below-market wages if fortunate enough to obtain a position within
367. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979).
368. See Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 247-48 (1998) (requiring that
prosecutors prove a person’s prior criminal history by a preponderance of the evidence, but
noting “we express no view on whether some heightened standard of proof might apply to
sentencing determinations that bear significantly on the severity of the sentence”); United
States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 156 & n.2, 157 (1997) (per curiam) (noting a “divergence of
opinion among the Circuits as to whether, in extreme circumstances, relevant conduct that
would dramatically increase the sentence must be based on clear and convincing evidence”).
369. Under this set of proposed assignments, more stringent procedural protections would
be necessary if (1) the person upon whom the sanction would be imposed raises a colorable
claim that the proposed sanctions would preclude that person or his or her family from
meeting basic needs or would interrupt activities that support that end and (2) the government in turn fails to produce evidence uniquely in its control regarding the downstream
implications of systems it has created that may interfere with payment. See supra notes 29899 and accompanying text. One possibility is to preclude the imposition of economic sanctions
until the government provides relevant information in its control. An alternative would be to
raise the standard of proof to beyond a reasonable doubt. It should be noted that the imposition of a rebuttable presumption would be insufficient in this context because it merely
serves to shift the burden of persuasion, which would already be placed on the government
under the proposed assignment. See Solum, supra note 107, at 700-02 (explaining that imposition of presumption—a corollary to burdens of persuasion—can be justified where it
creates incentives to reduce future uncertainty and deter bad acts, using as an example the
presumption that spoliated documents contained evidence unfavorable to the party who
destroyed them).
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the jail or prison370—will have implications for the person’s fiscal
condition that would not exist in the civil setting in which sentences
of incarceration are not allowed. But available income is part of the
consideration of financial effect regardless of whether a person is
subjected to incarceration or not, and whether the government
chooses to subject a person to criminal or civil proceedings.
The assignment of a clear and convincing evidence standard for
ascertaining financial effect is justified on two grounds. First is the
imprecise nature and effective finality of the inquiry. In the context
of fines and fees that will result in ongoing debt, the question is
inherently forward looking, and so a court is unable to account for
unforeseen personal or societal fiscal calamities.371 And in any case,
there is a substantial risk that the court will fail to account for
racial or class bias in reaching the determination, a particularly
important risk in light of the disproportionate enforcement of
behaviors that often results in the imposition of fines, fees, and
forfeitures.372 The dearth of opportunities for post-imposition relief
via appeal, pardon, or other processes essentially locks in the error.373 Taken together, those uncertainties and conclusiveness not
only raise the risk that excessive economic sanctions will be imposed
on people unable to absorb them, but also increases the risk to the
government with respect to its interests in upholding the Constitution and ensuring that its legitimacy is not undermined by economic
sanctions that line its coffers while impoverishing its citizenry.
Beyond the risk created by the uncertainty of the inquiry, the
clear and convincing evidence standard is justified because of the
way in which lawmakers’ decisions to adopt highly punitive penalties for non-payment and collateral consequences of conviction
heighten the risk to people, their families, and their communities.374
To be sure, the Court has previously mandated a clear and convincing standard in cases where the question at hand involves

370. See State and Federal Prison Wage Policies and Sourcing Information, PRISON POL’Y
INITIATIVE, https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/wage_policies.html [https://perma.cc/BJ57JLRX].
371. See supra notes 313-17 and accompanying text.
372. See supra notes 125-30, 326-28 and accompanying text.
373. See supra notes 329-41 and accompanying text.
374. See supra notes 175-91, 272-74 and accompanying text.
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significant deprivations, such as denaturalization,375 termination of
parental rights,376 and the loss of liberty due to civil commitment,377
in part because those deprivations were more significant than a
“mere loss of money” or property.378 As detailed above, however, the
consequences of imposing economic sanctions can result in the loss
of citizenship rights such as voting,379 financial precarity that places
family unity at risk,380 and deprivations of liberty through the use
of arrest warrants.381
It should be noted, however, that this assignment of a clear and
convincing standard need not be set in stone. Lawmakers could take
steps to limit the amount of economic sanctions imposed by abolishing the fees that they have tacked on over time to generate more
and more revenue, and by eliminating or significantly reducing the
addition of interest and collections costs so people can reach the
principal debt.382 Lawmakers could also significantly reduce the
downstream penalties associated with unpaid economic sanctions—
for example, by doing away with driver’s license suspensions, vehicle impoundment programs, arrest warrants, and similar consequences for those unable to pay; eliminating or strictly limiting
collateral consequences of conviction that restrict access to employment and public benefits; and disentangling ongoing debt resulting
from economic sanctions from other forms of punishment, such as
the length of probation and parole terms and voter disenfranchisement.383 Lawmakers could also reduce the risk of an erroneous

375. Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 122-23 (1943).
376. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747-48 (1982).
377. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 433 (1979).
378. Id. at 424; Santosky, 455 U.S. at 758-59; Schneiderman, 320 U.S. at 122.
379. See supra notes 191, 209-10 and accompanying text.
380. See supra notes 183-86, 199-200 and accompanying text.
381. See supra notes 176, 178-79 and accompanying text.
382. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
383. See supra notes 175-79, 187-90, 272-74 and accompanying text; see also Colgan, supra
note 188, at 77-80. Lawmakers could also eliminate penal disenfranchisement entirely, as the
District of Columbia did in 2020, joining Maine and Vermont as jurisdictions in which a conviction does not restrict the franchise. Fenit Nirappil, D.C. on the Brink of Allowing Inmates
to Vote from Prison, WASH. POST (July 8, 2020, 3:20 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
local/dc-politics/dc-prison-voting/2020/07/08/2683bd1e-c11d-11ea-b4f6-cb39cd8940fb_story.
html [https://perma.cc/7HCL-HM54].

484

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:407

imposition of excessive economic sanctions by creating meaningful
ongoing opportunities for pre- and post-imposition remission.384
ii. Excessiveness of Fines, Fees & Forfeitures: Criminal
Turning now to the question of overall excessiveness, we begin
with the imposition of fines, fees, and forfeitures in criminal settings
in which people are afforded full procedural protections including
proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and access to counsel.385 As
with the question of financial effect, a balancing of the governmental interests and private interests at stake along with the risks of an
erroneous determination support the assignment of a clear and
convincing evidence standard.386
The governmental interest in avoiding an overly protective
assignment of burdens is highest in this setting. Ensuring that guilt
is established beyond a reasonable doubt shores up the offense
seriousness side of the proportionality analysis and supports
governmental claims that its interests in responding to violations of
the law and depriving people of the instrumentalities and proceeds
of crimes are more firmly established.387 That, and the fact that
people subjected to economic sanctions have counsel to argue on
their behalf at each stage of the proceedings, also increases the
governmental interest in ensuring that the Excessive Fines Clause
will be enforced.388
384. See supra notes 334-45 and accompanying text.
385. There are many reasons to question the benefit of the procedural protections afforded
in criminal proceedings. See, e.g., Eve Brensike Primus, Culture as a Structural Problem in
Indigent Defense, 100 MINN. L. REV. 1769, 1783-90 (2016) (regarding chronic underfunding
of indigent defense services); Thea Johnson, Fictional Pleas, 94 IND. L.J. 855 (2019) (regarding
the implications of collateral consequences for plea bargaining). The point made here is that
in terms of governmental interests, private interests, and risks of erroneous decision-making,
the procedural protections afforded in criminal settings are comparatively less problematic
than in civil processes.
386. As with the assignment of a clear and convincing standard on the question of financial
effect, if the government failed to meet its discovery obligations it would trigger enhanced
procedural protections including either a prohibition on imposing economic sanctions until the
government produces relevant information or an increase in the burden to a beyond a
reasonable doubt standard. See supra note 369.
387. See supra notes 112-47, 299-308 and accompanying text.
388. See supra notes 215-23, 227 and accompanying text. Criminal cases in which counsel
is effectively denied would fall under the assignment of standards in the civil setting
addressed in the next subpart.
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Though the governmental interests related to responding to
offending behavior are heightened in the criminal arena, its interests in administrative efficiency and legitimacy present a more
complicated picture. It might be assumed that a clear and convincing standard could overly incentivize the raising of excessive fines
challenges, tying up the courts’ dockets.389 But an uptick in hearings
may be most likely in jurisdictions where governmental legitimacy
is at greatest risk, for example, where lawmakers have established
very high-dollar fine amounts, imposed fee after fee in a bid at taxavoidance, or drawn forfeiture laws so loosely that the loss of cash
or property is possible even when the offense is minor or the connection to any offense is tenuous at best.390 Challenges would also
likely increase in cases in which the risk that economic sanctions
will create or exacerbate poverty is aggravated by punitive responses to nonpayment—among the very cases that undermine governmental legitimacy by leading people to question whether the
government prizes revenues over justice.391 Further, such an uptick
may not even increase system costs given that the resulting imposition of fewer unmanageable economic sanctions could lessen the
reliance on the administrative apparatus created to collect and enforce those debts that go unpaid.392
As to the possibility of private harms, the risks of an erroneous
determination of excessiveness are reduced in the criminal sphere
due to the enhanced procedural protections afforded in criminal settings, as well as the assignment of a heightened standard of proof
for determining financial effect proposed above.393 Because guilt is
established beyond a reasonable doubt, the certainty of whether an
offense occurred is greater, contributing to the ability to properly
assess overall proportionality.394 On the other side of the proportionality equation is punishment severity, assessed in part through the

389. Cf. Pimentel v. City of Los Angeles, 974 F.3d 917, 928 & n.8 (9th Cir. 2020) (Bennett,
J., concurring in judgment) (expressing concern that individual excessiveness determinations
on parking tickets would tie up the courts).
390. See supra notes 118-23, 136-47 and accompanying text.
391. See supra notes 175-86 and accompanying text; Colgan, supra note 27, at 58-61.
392. See, e.g., Colgan, supra note 258, at 69-73.
393. See supra Part II.D.3.b.i.
394. See supra notes 224-27 and accompanying text.
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determination of financial effect.395 The assignment of the burden of
proving financial effect to a clear and convincing standard will aid
in reducing the risks caused by the inherently imprecise nature of
that determination.
The question then becomes whether, in this more protective criminal setting, it would be sufficient to use the preponderance of the
evidence standard—within which the parties “share the risk of error
in roughly equal fashion”396—in light of the Court’s admonition that
“[t]he individual should not be asked to share equally with society
the risk of error when the possible injury to the individual is significantly greater than any possible harm to the state.”397
Whether adjudicated criminally or not, the potential private
harms outweigh the at times contradictory governmental interests
in play, supporting application of a heightened standard. The imposition of constitutionally excessive economic sanctions not only
makes it more likely people will be unable to meet their own and
their families’ basic needs, it also triggers the punitive and stigmatizing array of penalties for non-payment and increases in punishment lawmakers have designed. Those systems keep people,
their families, and their communities under the government’s
thumb not due to their culpability for the underlying offense, but
because they are unable to pay or absorb the loss. Given the severity
of these punishments, the harm caused to innocent family and
community members, and the way in which these results undermine
the governmental interests in constitutional enforcement and legitimacy, the possible injury is significantly greater than any likely
governmental harm. A clear and convincing evidence standard is
warranted.
As with the assignment of the clear and convincing evidence
standard with respect to financial effect, the government itself holds
the keys to a less onerous standard for proving overall excessiveness. In addition to the reforms noted above, such as the elimination
of fees and punitive downstream responses to nonpayment, lawmakers could, for example, more strictly limit what constitutes a
significant nexus for purposes of criminal forfeiture so that it is less
395. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
396. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979).
397. Id. at 427.
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likely that a family’s home, automobile, or other essential property
will be lost due to a tangential relationship to a crime.398
iii. Excessiveness of Fines, Fees & Forfeitures: Civil
For the purpose of assuring fundamental fairness in assigning
burdens, the civil setting is distinct from the criminal in two critical
ways—both of which support the use of a beyond a reasonable doubt
standard for assessing overall excessiveness.399
First, the risk of an erroneous decision is increased where lawmakers have denied access to counsel who might present countervailing evidence and have eschewed the beyond a reasonable doubt
standard for ascertaining whether an offense even occurred.400 This
is crucial to the proportionality inquiry, which depends on the
existence of an offense against which the proportionality of the
punishment can be measured.401 In other words, without those
safeguards, the protections against the wrongful imposition of any
punishment is reduced, making the risk of excessive punishment
greater.
Second, by choosing to create systems by which the government
can more effortlessly extract money and property from people, lawmakers have made it easier to abuse the government’s penal power
as a means of tax-avoidance, with such abuses disproportionately
borne by politically vulnerable Black and Latinx communities. They
have done so not only by denying access to counsel and reducing
burdens of proof, but also in some cases by allowing guilt and punishment to be imposed by lay judges without legal training or by
seeking forfeitures through complicated procedures without ever
even charging a person with a crime.402 Not only do these and other
procedural barriers undermine the government’s interest in being
398. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
399. Unlike with the standard for financial effect and fines, fees, and forfeitures in the
criminal sphere, see supra note 369, it is more difficult to increase the beyond a reasonable
doubt standard here should the government fail to meet its discovery obligations. One possibility is to increase the standard to one of absolute certainty. The alternative of prohibiting
imposition of economic sanctions absent production of relevant information also remains
available.
400. See supra notes 215-23, 301-08 and accompanying text.
401. See supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text.
402. See supra notes 141-47, 228-32, 318-25 and accompanying text.
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perceived as legitimate, these choices strike at the very heart of
what the Excessive Fines Clause is designed to protect against.403 In
light of the fact that the risk of harm to people against whom economic sanctions are imposed remains just as great as in the criminal
setting, requiring the government to prove proportionality beyond
a reasonable doubt is consistent with fundamental fairness. That
standard can serve an important symbolic function to the community at large: that the government shall not be allowed to engage
in “policing for profit,”404 or to maintain “modern-day debtors’ prison[s].”405
As in the criminal context, it is within lawmakers’ power to avoid
the imposition of a beyond a reasonable doubt standard by choosing
to turn away from systems that make it so easy to abuse governmental power. This includes the reforms noted above, as well as
additional reforms targeted at ensuring meaningful consideration
of excessive fines claims through the provision of counsel, and
through the reduction or elimination of fees to contest a forfeiture
along with other procedural hurdles.406 And, of course, the government may also avoid this higher standard by holding itself to the
burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
iv. Excessiveness of Restitution
Restitution paid to non-governmental victims is on a different
footing. The proposed assignment above would place the burden of
proof on the person against whom restitution is imposed to prove
the disproportionality of the restitution award in recognition of the
reduced risk of abuse in play when the penalty imposed accrues to
someone other than the government.407 There are reasons, however,
to impose only a preponderance of evidence standard on this

403. See Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 689 (2019).
404. See, e.g., LISA KNEPPER, JENNIFER MCDONALD, KATHY SANCHEZ & ELYSE SMITH POHL,
INST. FOR JUST., POLICING FOR PROFIT: THE ABUSE OF CIVIL ASSET FORFEITURE (3d ed. 2020).
405. Kate Gibson, Poor Defendants Say They Face Modern-Day Debtors’ Prison, CBS NEWS
(Aug. 23, 2016, 5:15 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/poor-defendants-say-they-face-mod
ern-day-debtors-prison/ [https://perma.cc/9VEW-CD7H].
406. See supra notes 215-32 and accompanying text.
407. See supra Part II.D.3.a.
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question.408 First, while the government has an interest in making
victims whole through restitution, the imposition of unmanageable
restitution does not make it forthcoming and may even undermine
victims’ needs by making the communities they live in less safe.409
Further, by maintaining a focus on restitution assessed against people convicted of crimes, lawmakers avoid the responsibility of creating systems that better address victim needs.410 Second, restitution
carries with it the same very serious consequences for the person
against whom it is imposed and their innocent family members and
communities.411 Taken together, these considerations support the
conclusion that the standard of proof should be that of a preponderance.412 But like the other assignments, reforms that lessen the risk
of harm against those upon whom restitution is imposed—the
elimination of punitive penalties for nonpayment, imposition of
additional punishments, and application of collateral consequences
upon conviction, for instance—could support the assignment of a
clear and convincing standard down the road.
***
At first glance, this combination of burdens on various issues may
raise questions of administrability, which—as noted above—is a
consideration relevant to establishing burdens of proof.413 But each
component is determined separately; the financial effect of the
forfeiture of an automobile, for example, would be ascertained
independently from the overall examination of disproportionality,
which takes into account financial effect in conjunction with crime
facts, sentencing factors, and the dollar value of the total package
of economic sanctions.414 Courts are already adept at this kind of
408. Again, should the government fail to meet its discovery obligations, it would be
appropriate to either prohibit the imposition of restitution until those obligations are met or
to reduce this standard further, for example to a probable cause standard. See supra note 369.
409. See supra notes 148-53 and accompanying text.
410. See Colgan, supra note 123, at 1558-65, 1579-80.
411. See supra Part II.A.2.
412. Cf. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 168-69 (1986) (assigning the burden of proof
to the prosecution but only by a preponderance, satisfying the need for deterrence without
overcorrecting in a way that would deprive juries of seeing probative evidence).
413. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
414. See Colgan & McLean, supra note 32, at 443-49.
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mixing of burdens, as is done when the prosecution seeks to supplement evidence proven beyond a reasonable doubt at trial or through
a guilty plea with facts, such as prior criminal history, which are
proven under a preponderance of the evidence standard.415 There
are more complex questions related to administrability when a sentencing court imposes both fines, fees, or criminal forfeitures and
restitution, or other punishments with differing burdens and standards of proof, which are addressed below.
III. ADDRESSING CASES INVOLVING MULTIPLE FORMS OF
PUNISHMENT
This Article has proposed a varying assignment of burdens and
standards of persuasion depending on the nature of the economic
sanction—differentiating between fines, fees, and forfeitures on the
one hand, and restitution on the other—as well as whether the
sanctions are imposed in criminal or civil proceedings. This raises
the question of whether it is feasible to employ those different burdens in a single case in which multiple punishments are imposed.
This issue does not implicate the determination of financial effect,
which must be decided prior to conducting the excessiveness inquiry
because it helps establish the severity of the punishment.416 The
issue also will not arise in cases involving minor offenses for which
the only available punishments are fines and fees, such as parking
or low-level traffic or ordinance violations.417 But it would apply in
cases, for example, in which fines and fees are imposed in addition
to restitution, or in cases where economic sanctions are imposed in
addition to punishments challengeable under the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, such as execution,
incarceration, or probation.418
Consider the following hypothetical: a statute sets the punishment for a misdemeanor graffitiing of private property as restitution
and up to a $1,000 fine. The two forms of economic sanction are
inherently linked in the disproportionality analysis by the fact that
415.
416.
417.
418.

See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
See Pimentel v. City of Los Angeles, 974 F.3d 917, 920 (9th Cir. 2020).
See Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 686 (2019).
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there is only one underlying offense against which their collective
punitive severity must be measured:
Offense Seriousness
Crime Facts re: Graffitiing of Property
[Sentencing Factors, if any]

Punishment Severity
Dollar Value of Restitution + Fine
Financial Effect of Restitution +
Fine

If the dollar value and financial effect of the restitution were
weighed against the offense’s seriousness separately from the dollar
value and financial effect of the fine, the government would improperly have two bites at the apple. It would allow the imposition
of restitution and a fine that may not be separately disproportionate
to the graffitiing, but collectively disproportionate. Therefore, as the
dollar value of either the restitution, the fine, or both increases, the
more disproportionate the punishment becomes to the act of graffitiing.419
That said, beginning the proportionality inquiry with a focus on
restitution can make the distinctions in burdens and standards of
persuasion in this scenario administrable. Assuming the Court
adopts the burdens and standards posited above, the defendant
would have the burden of proving the disproportionality of the restitution by a preponderance of the evidence, and the government
would hold the burden of proving the proportionality of the fine by
clear and convincing evidence.420 The sentencing judge can manage
this distinction by beginning with the analysis of restitution; if the
defendant meets the burden of showing that the proposed compensable amount is disproportionate to the offense, requiring the imposition of a lower restitution award, then the government will
necessarily fail to show by any standard that an additional fine is
allowable.421 If, in contrast, a court determines that the compensable
419. See State v. Timbs, 169 N.E.3d 361, 372-74 (Ind. 2021) (explaining that the
assessment of punishment severity included the challenge forfeiture of a vehicle and “other
sanctions imposed on Timbs” including “six years of restricted liberty as well as $1,200 in fees
and costs”).
420. See supra Part II.D.3.a.ii, iv.
421. See United States v. Bajakajian, 542 U.S. 321, 336-40 (1998); see also id. at 349
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“The majority affirms the reduced $15,000 forfeiture on de novo
review ... which it can do only if a forfeiture of even $15,001 would have suffered from a gross
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amount is not grossly disproportionate to the offense, then the defendant has not met his or her burden and the full restitution award
could issue.422 The question then becomes whether the government
can meet its burden of showing that the addition of a fine on top of
the restitution amount remains proportionate to the offense.423 This
ordering of the assessment has the benefit of prizing restitution over
the types of revenue-generating sanctions that raise the risk of
abuse the Clause is particularly intended to protect against.424
We can also test the effects of combining competing burdens
between the Excessive Fines and Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clauses by using a different hypothetical: a statute setting out the
punishments available for possession of a small quantity of narcotics, for which the maximum term of incarceration is one year and
the maximum fine is $10,000.
To undertake this analysis we must begin with a few assumptions. The first assumption is that the Court has adopted the assignment of burdens and standards of persuasion posited herein—
for this hypothetical, the assumption is that the prosecution must
establish the proportionality of the fine by clear and convincing
evidence.425 The analysis that follows also assumes that the Court
would require the defendant to prove gross disproportionality for
cruel and unusual punishments purposes by a preponderance of the
evidence. The Court has clearly placed the burden of persuasion on
the defendant, but to date has only described that burden in sentencing cases as “heavy.”426 It has, however, used that same term to
describe the preponderance standard in other settings,427 and
adopted a preponderance standard in cruel and unusual punishments cases challenging conditions of confinement.428 This should
not be taken to suggest that this low standard puts a showing of
gross disproportionality well within the challenger’s grasp.429
disproportion.”).
422. See id. at 336-40 (majority opinion).
423. See Pimentel v. City of Los Angeles, 974 F.3d 917, 925 (9th Cir. 2020).
424. See id.
425. See supra Part II.D.3.a.ii.
426. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 175 (1976).
427. See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 185 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
428. See Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 594-95 (1998).
429. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1003-04 (1991) (plurality) (opinion of
Kennedy, J.).
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Rather, because the Court has shown such significant deference to
lawmakers’ authority in establishing nonfinancial punishments, the
burden can only be met if the defendant proves that it is more likely
than not that no rational basis for the punishment—whether retributive or utilitarian—could exist.430
Similar to the hypothesized imposition of restitution and a fine,
these punishments are linked in the disproportionality analysis by
the fact that there is only one underlying offense—possession of
narcotics:
Offense Seriousness
Crime Facts re: Possession of
Narcotics
[Sentencing Factors, if any]

Punishment Severity
Dollar Value of Fine
Financial Effect of Fine
Term of Incarceration

Therefore, any approach to the application of these divergent burdens and standards of persuasion must ensure that the collective
punishment—both economic and carceral—is not grossly disproportionate to the seriousness of the offense.431
That the economic and carceral punishments are collectively
imposed against a single offense does not mean that their constitutionality necessarily lives or dies with each other. Undergirding
these competing burdens is the extreme deference the Court has
afforded lawmakers in the cruel and unusual punishments context and the suspicion with which it has approached lawmakers in
the excessive fines context.432 Throughout the cruel and unusual
punishments doctrine, the Court has based its interpretations of
430. See id.
431. See supra note 419 and accompanying text; Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 366
(1910) (considering all aspects of the punishment of cadena temporal, including imprisonment
for at least twelve years, during which time the person was to be chained at the ankle and
wrist and subjected to “hard and painful labor,” the stripping of parental and marital rights,
and lifetime surveillance and restrictions, including the inability to vote); cf. Blanton v. City
of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 543-45 (1989) (considering a period of incarceration and
other statutory penalties such as fines in assessing whether available punishments are
sufficiently serious to justify a right to a jury trial).
432. Compare Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1003-04 (plurality) (opinion of Kennedy, J.) (deferring
to the state legislature because it “could with reason conclude” that petitioner’s crime
warranted the sentence imposed), with Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 689 (2019)
(describing how lawmakers could abuse their ability to impose fines).
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the Clause’s scope on considerable deference to lawmakers’ ability
to devise appropriate punishments for people found to have committed crimes.433 As Justice Kennedy explained in the Harmelin v.
Michigan plurality, such decisions “implicate difficult and enduring questions respecting the sanctity of the individual, the nature
of law, and the relation between law and the social order.”434 And
while in adopting a gross, rather than strict, disproportionality test
the Bajakajian majority showed deference to lawmakers,435 throughout its excessive fines jurisprudence, the Court has repeatedly called
into question whether lawmakers will set financial punishments in
accord with penal principles or will rather act to secure tax-avoidance.436 In other words, a court may hold that imposing incarceration is constitutional while also finding that the use of a fine violates the core principles of the Excessive Fines Clause.437 Further,
unlike in the cruel and unusual punishments setting, the inclusion
of the subjective consideration of financial effect in assessing the
severity of a fine gives a person challenging its constitutionality
more secure footing to argue that the fine, as applied in a particular
case, is constitutionally excessive.438
Given the distinctions between the degree of deference, or lack
thereof, incumbent to the two clauses, and the structural distinction
of bringing the subjectivity of financial effect into the excessiveness
inquiry, it is appropriate for a court to begin by assessing the constitutionality of the two forms of punishment separately under their
respective clauses. This does not, however, lend itself to the same
433. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 998 (plurality) (opinion of Kennedy, J.).
434. Id.
435. United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 336 (1998) (“[J]udgments about the appropriate punishment for an offense belong in the first instance to the legislature.”).
436. See, e.g., Timbs, 139 S. Ct. at 689.
437. See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 978 n.9 (plurality) (opinion of Scalia, J.). This distinction
between affording great deference in the cruel and unusual punishments context and suspicion in the excessive fines context is possible in part because the Court has to date treated
lawmakers’ decision-making about what constitutes a crime and whether execution, incarceration, or community supervision are appropriate in a vacuum, rather than recognizing that
the very same lawmakers might be motivated to create or retain substantive criminal violations in part for their revenue-generating capacity. Whether grappling with the reality that
lawmakers may have multiple interests opens the door for reexamination of the Court’s
rational basis approach to the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, however, is outside
of the scope of this Article.
438. See Colgan & McLean, supra note 32, at 443-49.
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type of preference ordering suggested above for the restitution-fine
combination. In that situation, while it may be constitutionally excessive in some instances, restitution clearly runs a smaller risk of
offending the Clause’s core aims than fines, fees, and forfeitures,
and so prizing it in the disproportionality analysis makes sense.439
That is not, however, the case in the fines-incarceration context
where the Court’s central understanding of the two clauses stand in
contradiction.440 It is also not as simple as prizing financial punishments over the more severe punishment of incarceration. While the
Court has generally understood there to be a hierarchy of punishment severity, with fines ranking less severe than at least incarceration,441 and while certainly a lengthy term of incarceration is a
more severe punishment than a small fine, it is not so clear that economic sanctions are always less severe than other forms of punishment.442 This is borne out, for example, by people who opt for jail
terms to “work off” economic sanctions in order to avoid the ongoing
financial precarity such debt creates.443
Once separately assessed, however, it would be critical to engage
in an additional consideration: whether collectively the punishments that survive the first stage of review are so severe that they
outweigh the underlying offense. If the answer is no, a court could
constitutionally impose both forms of punishment.444 If the answer
is yes, a court would be required to adjust, reducing the economic
sanctions, the term of incarceration, or both.445
A potential benefit of assigning disparate burdens and standards
of persuasion between economic sanctions and other forms of
punishment is that it requires courts to actually consider the nature
of the punishment and its multiple forms in a way that may not
occur if the sanctions were lumped together at the outset. More than
just sand in the gears, the approach ensures that the economic
sanctions imposed—which may otherwise be seen as mere add-ons
439. See Timbs, 139 S. Ct. at 689.
440. Compare Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 998 (plurality) (opinion of Kennedy, J.), with Timbs,
139 S. Ct. at 689.
441. See, e.g., Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 294 & n.18 (1983).
442. See Colgan & McLean, supra note 32, at 443-49.
443. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
444. See Solem, 463 U.S. at 290.
445. See id.
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to a period of incarceration or other punishment—do not get lost in
the shuffle, but instead are understood as what they are: significant
aspects of punishment, with real perils to both citizen and state,
subject to the Clause’s protections.
CONCLUSION
Burdens of proof matter. They do more than tell the parties what
their obligations are and the decision maker how to decide—though
of course burdens serve those important purposes as well. Assigning
burdens provides us an opportunity to consider the incredible, and
even devastating, consequences economic sanctions pose in conjunction with the ways in which lawmakers have designed broad and
overlapping processes and structures of punishment. In doing so, we
are able to ensure that the burdens work to cabin governmental
overreach, thus reflecting societal values.446 Once assigned, at sentencing, articulating the various burdens of proof creates moments
for reflection on the severity of economic sanctions in and of their
own right, and in conjunction with other forms of punishment.

446. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (holding that a beyond a reasonable doubt
standard is required for the guilt phase of juvenile trials because it is “critical that the moral
force of the criminal law not be diluted”); see also Cruzan v. Dir. Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S.
261, 283 (1990) (“But not only does the standard of proof reflect the importance of a particular
adjudication, it also serves as ‘a societal judgment about how the risk of error should be
distributed between the litigants.’” (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 755 (1982))).

